The fallout of a lost school year
BAMAKO — As Mali’s 2026-2027 school year officially begins, a stark contradiction is unfolding across the country. The transitional president, General Assimi Goïta, has proclaimed this “Year of Education and Culture,” yet more than 2,400 schools will not reopen their doors. The result: over 730,000 children are left without instruction. This record-breaking failure has ignited public debate and raised urgent questions about what comes next for a generation caught in the crossfire.
Schools as targets: the human cost
Nationwide, more than one in five schools is now out of service. This collapse is not accidental; it is the direct consequence of the gradual territorial expansion of armed terrorist groups. Schools are looted or burned by Islamist katibas that reject so-called “Western” education, and some are converted into makeshift shelters for thousands of internally displaced people. The map of closures reveals a geography of state abandonment. In the Kidal region of the far north, nearly 84% of schools remain closed. In neighboring Ménaka, where the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) operates, 52% of schools in the academy are deemed “non-functional.” The situation is no better in Gao or in central circles like Mopti and Bandiagara, as well as parts of Ségou and Koulikoro, now directly exposed to the threat of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM, affiliated with Al-Qaeda).
A junta’s promises meet harsh reality
For the transitional authorities, who built their legitimacy on promises of restoring national sovereignty and security, these figures are a bitter rebuke. Since the coups of 2020 and 2021, the junta has made a radical geopolitical shift, breaking with traditional partners: expelling French Barkhane forces, ending the UN mission (MINUSMA), and scrapping the Algiers peace accord. To fill the void, Bamako turned to Russian military partnership and mercenaries from the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner). Yet the promised swift military reconquest has turned into a series of dramatic setbacks. Despite the highly publicized recapture of Kidal in late 2023, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their Russian auxiliaries have become mired in bloody wars of attrition. The resounding defeat at Tinzaouatène in summer 2024 against rebel forces and GSIM fighters marked a turning point, exposing structural vulnerabilities in the junta’s military strategy. Far from containing the threat, this exclusively security-focused approach has triggered devastating reprisals from terrorist groups. They have intensified operations beyond their traditional northern and central sanctuaries, striking at the heart of institutions, as seen in the spectacular attacks on the Faladié gendarmerie school and Bamako’s military airport in September 2024.
Mapping the encirclement: territorial control
Today, an analysis of territorial control paints a picture of largely fragmented state sovereignty. In the far north, covering Kidal, Ménaka, and Taoudénit, the state maintains only an essentially insular presence, limited to heavily fortified administrative centers. ISGS controls vast desert stretches of Ménaka, imposing its law and collecting zakat from populations, while GSIM and various regional armed groups vie for border routes with Mauritania and Algeria. In the center, including Mopti, Ségou, and San—considered the beating heart of the GSIM insurgency through Katiba Macina—rural areas have almost entirely escaped government control. Insurgents enforce regular blockades on entire towns like Niono and Djenné and mandate the closure of public schools under threat of targeted executions of teachers. Finally, in the south and west, notably the regions of Koulikoro, Sikasso, and Kayes, once spared, a rapid infiltration is now underway. Dormant GSIM cells orchestrate economic blockades, particularly targeting fuel and major roads, gradually strangling supplies to the capital.
A generation sacrificed: reactions and outlook
Against this backdrop, the contrast between official rhetoric and daily life for Malians has never been sharper. While transitional leaders celebrate the country’s “refoundation,” access to knowledge—a fundamental right—continues to recede dramatically. Each closed school represents another ideological victory for obscurantist groups, which find in idle youth a fertile ground for recruitment. The “Year of Education” proclaimed in Bamako may well become, for hundreds of thousands of young Malians, another blank year amid the din of weapons. The fallout is already sparking debate: communities are demanding solutions, and the international community is watching closely. What comes next will determine whether this generation can be saved from the brink.
