Niger: inside the mindset of a junta that fears its own shadows
When a leader seizes power through a coup, the fear of being toppled by the same method can become a permanent obsession. In Niger, General Abdourahamane Tiani’s response to the failed putsch of 29 August reveals a regime whose survival instinct is reshaping the state itself.
From coup maker to coup target: the 29 august turning point
On 26 July 2023, General Tiani overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum. Three years later, on 29 August 2026, the man who took power by force faced his own attempted overthrow. This time, the gunfire did not come from outside. It came from within. The presidential palace was targeted, Air Base 101 was attacked, and the public television station was stormed. For several hours, the balance of power inside the military apparatus remained uncertain. Some soldiers hesitated to take sides while mutineers tried to rally other officers.
For a leader who rose through a coup, the message was brutal: the very scenario he helped normalize could now be used against him. The coup attempt did not topple Tiani, but it fundamentally altered the equation of power.
A chain of command in flux
The junta reportedly relied on several hundred Russian Africa Corps soldiers to retake Air Base 101. At least 200 military personnel, mostly from special forces, have been arrested since 29 August. Then the command structure began to shift. On 11 September, the chief of defence staff, General Moussa Salaou Barmou, was dismissed. Days later, four ministers were replaced. Officially, these moves are described as reorganization and securing the chain of command. But in politics, timing tells its own story: after being threatened, the regime is rearranging itself around those it deems most reliable.
The 17 september decree: citizenship as a weapon
On 17 September, Tiani signed a decree stripping five Nigeriens of their nationality on a provisional basis. Among them is Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou, former prime minister under Bazoum. The decree cites “intelligence with foreign powers,” spreading data likely to disturb public order, alleged participation in demoralizing the army and the nation, and threats to state security.
It must be emphasized: these are accusations and prosecutions mentioned in the decree, not a final judicial conviction. But politically, the symbolism is heavy. Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou is not just any opponent. He belongs to the former state apparatus. He served as prime minister under the president Tiani overthrew. With this decree, five more Nigeriens are provisionally deprived of their nationality under a mechanism established in 2024. According to the Nigerien press agency, the total now stands at 25 people.
Bazoum is gone, but his shadow lingers
Three years after the coup, former president Mohamed Bazoum remains a central figure in Niger’s political confrontation. His regime has vanished. His institutions have been dismantled. But the men who served him continue to appear in the security and judicial files of the new power. This raises a troubling question: at what point does defending the state stop being a security operation and become a political cleanup?
The risk of seeing enemies everywhere
Since 29 August, the Nigerien authorities have faced a threat that no longer comes only from armed groups or external adversaries. According to reported events, the danger can now emerge from within the military apparatus itself. When the loyalty of soldiers becomes a central question, the temptation to hunt for culprits, relays, accomplices, or sponsors can be overwhelming.
The risk is that suspicion becomes a method of governance. A military officer replaced. A minister sidelined. Soldiers arrested. Former officials of the Bazoum regime targeted. And now, citizens provisionally stripped of their nationality. Taken separately, each act has its official justification. Strung together, they paint a picture of a regime that, after being directly threatened, is trying to regain control over every circle that could represent a vulnerability.
Can a leader who seized power by force ever feel secure?
This may be the most embarrassing question for the regime. How do you govern sustainably when a power born of a coup discovers that another coup can be applied to it? General Tiani now knows this mechanics from the inside. He knows a military power can seem firmly installed until the day a few officers decide to cross a line. The events of 29 August proved it: what was supposed to be impossible became possible. What was unthinkable happened around the presidential palace.
When a regime discovers it can be overthrown by the same methods that brought it to power, fear of the next plot can quickly become a political obsession.
“Niger is me”?
Critics of the regime see a worrying drift. By deciding who is loyal, who is suspect, who must be arrested, who must be sidelined, and now who can provisionally keep their nationality, Tiani gives his detractors the impression of a leader acting as if he alone holds the keys to the republic. As if Niger must be divided between those who support the regime and those who must be excluded. As if serving under Bazoum is now a permanent political fault. As if any dissenting voice must necessarily hide a plot.
General Tiani is obviously not Niger. But the concentration of decisions around his person fuels a fundamental question: how far can a regime go when, to protect itself, it ends up seeing threats behind every face?
The paradox of a power born from a putsch
Here lies the irony of this story. Tiani rose to the top after a coup. Today, he leads a regime that has itself just escaped a coup attempt. Between these two dates, Niger seems to have tipped into a cycle where each crisis produces new purges, each suspicion calls for a new sanction, and each attempt at contestation strengthens the concentration of power.
The 17 September decree is therefore not just a matter of nationality. It is a new episode in a broader battle: that of a regime trying to eliminate the zones of uncertainty around itself. One question remains, perhaps the most important: by fighting real or supposed plots, is Tiani building a system where any challenge automatically becomes a plot?
If so, the problem would no longer be just who wants to overthrow Tiani. It would also be why a regime that claims to be firmly installed now seems so afraid of those around it. And above all, how far will this logic go? For when a regime starts treating its own citizens as potential threats, the line between protecting the state and protecting the power becomes dangerously thin.
