Senegal’s evolving state-faith relations: formalizing the sacred?

In Sénégal, religion extends far beyond the private realm, actively contributing to social cohesion, mediating conflicts, shaping education, and occasionally influencing political dynamics. Despite its pervasive influence, the interactions between the State and religious communities largely rely on informal practices. This raises a crucial question: can formalizing worship move beyond clientelism without compromising the nation’s secular identity? The core debate may no longer be whether to institutionalize these state-religious relations, but rather how to achieve this without inadvertently institutionalizing religion itself.

First, it’s essential to dispel a common misconception: formalizing the relationship between the State and religious communities doesn’t automatically mean religion becomes a state affair. Several West African nations have already opted to establish public bodies dedicated to religious affairs.

Mali, for instance, operates a Ministry of Religious Affairs, Worship, and Customs. Guinea maintains a General Secretariat for Religious Affairs, while Côte d’Ivoire has a specific administration overseeing religious worship. Morocco has taken this institutionalization much further, notably through its Supreme Council of Ulemas and the esteemed role of Amir Al-Mouminine.

Sénégal itself already possesses the beginnings of such institutionalization. The establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Integration of Arabic Language Graduates in April 2024 marked a significant initial stride. Its director, Djim Dramé, openly states the objective: to “formalize relations between the State and religions” and to actively promote peace, harmony, and coexistence. The current discussion, therefore, centers less on the necessity of an administration for religious matters and more on the extent of institutionalization Sénégal intends to pursue.

Islamologist Abdoul Aziz Kébé views the announced transformation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs into a General Delegation as a “positive evolution” and an “institutional elevation.” His argument is particularly compelling: “religion is a resource in our country,” especially in fostering social cohesion and ensuring the adoption of public policies.

If religion already serves as a vital social, cultural, and even political resource for Sénégal, why persist in managing its interactions with the State primarily through personal relationships, courtesy visits, ad hoc delegations, and situational arrangements? It is within this context that Ousmane Sonko’s proposal gains traction.

He advocates for a comprehensive formalization of state-religious relations, structured around several key propositions: establishing a dedicated budget for worship, elevating the Delegation for Religious Affairs to a Secretary of State or a full-fledged Ministry, officially recognizing certain privileges extended to religious leaders, and regulating special funds through a commission of sworn individuals.

A “collaborative secularism between politics and religion”

The underlying principle is clear: to transition from a system of discretionary favors to one governed by predefined rights and transparent rules. When a religious leader receives an administrative concession due to proximity to the President, it constitutes a favor. However, if the same concession is formalized by legislation, with clearly defined conditions applicable to all leaders meeting the criteria, it shifts into an institutional framework. The State’s role, therefore, should not be to control religious practice, but to establish a structured environment for its interactions with it.

Sénégal is constitutionally a secular state. This fundamental reality cannot be circumvented or diminished. The Constitution affirms the Republic as secular, democratic, and social, guaranteeing equality for all citizens regardless of religion and respecting all beliefs. Consequently, the formalization of worship cannot lead to any form of state religion.

Yet, the question remains whether secularism prohibits the State from organizing its relations with religious bodies. Political science professor Maurice Soudieck Dione aptly points out that Senegalese secularism has a unique history. It doesn’t precisely mirror the strict separation model seen in France. He describes it as a “collaborative secularism between politics and religion.” Thus, the distinctiveness of the Senegalese model lies in its operation through a “pragmatic accommodation” with confraternities and the Church.

However, the debate cannot be oversimplified to: “since religion holds significant sway in society, a Ministry of Worship must be created.” Seydou Ka, a journalist and columnist for Le Soleil newspaper, cautions against the risk of transforming secularism into a form of administrative control over religion. He articulates concerns about a “bureaucratization of the sacred” and a potential drift towards “laicism” that could undermine the autonomy of religious leaders.

This observation is fundamental, as there’s a critical distinction between formalizing relations *with* religions and formalizing religions *themselves*. In the former, the State establishes an administrative point of contact. In the latter, it gradually begins to define legitimacy, who can speak for a community, which activities are permissible, how places of worship should operate, and which religious leaders qualify for public recognition.

The fear of “bureaucratization of the sacred”

The State’s ambition to organize religions themselves presents a clear risk, potentially altering their fundamental nature. Researcher Bakary Sambe has perfectly encapsulated the danger inherent in the political-religious dynamic in Sénégal. He observes that “our leaders seek in religion a legitimacy they lack in politics.” The peril of institutionalization would be precisely to transform an already clientelistic relationship into a bureaucratized form of clientelism. Instead of politicians intermittently seeking religious blessings, permanent mechanisms for distributing public resources could emerge.

It is precisely because these risks exist that I believe institutionalization is necessary. Presently, a significant portion of the interactions between the State and religious authorities is highly personalized. A president cultivates a unique relationship with a particular Caliph. A minister maintains close ties with a specific religious family. A local community might more easily secure certain investments due to its religious prominence.

A major religious event receives special support because of its significance. The question then arises: is it better to leave these practices informal or subject them to public regulations? In my view, formalizing them is the superior approach. However, with a crucial caveat: we must not institutionalize faith itself; we must institutionalize the State’s relationship with religious practice.

This perspective aligns with Djim Dramé’s stance when he asserts that the Directorate of Religious Affairs aims to listen to “all religious sensitivities” and formalize state-religious interactions. The National Council of Laity has, moreover, expressed support for this initiative, seeing the Directorate as a potentially effective interface between the Church and the State. Its president, Philippe Abraham Tine, nonetheless stressed the importance of clearly articulating the structure’s role to prevent misunderstandings. This interfaith dimension is paramount.

Sénégal is a profoundly religious society, with Muslims constituting a vast majority, while Christian communities boast a considerable historical and social presence. This socio-historical reality warrants an institutional response. If the State supports citizens in education, healthcare, culture, or sports, why should it treat religious matters as a reality it can never institutionally acknowledge?

A public policy for religious matters

The State can support pilgrimages, help secure major religious events, fund training, contribute to the renovation of places of worship, and assist religious institutions, provided that rules are transparent and principles of equity are consistently applied. Islamologist Abdoul Aziz Kébé specifically highlights the goal of supporting “Muslim, Christian, and traditional religious” communities in practicing their faith and fostering their development. Ultimately, Ousmane Sonko’s proposal sparks a debate far more significant than a mere administrative question.

It compels Sénégal to examine its own model of secularism. Seydou Ka reminds us of the risk of bureaucratizing the sacred. Étienne Smith invites us to consider “proportional equidistance.” Seydi Diamil Niane emphasizes the necessity of institutionalizing relations between public authorities and religious leaders. Maurice Soudieck Dione demonstrates a unique collaboration between the political and religious spheres.

Experiences from Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Guinea, Niger, and Burkina Faso each illustrate various ways to organize these relationships. Sonko, however, poses a different question: why continue to manage through favors what could be governed by law? This is where the true value of his proposal lies. Provided, of course, that a fundamental error is avoided: institutionalizing worship must not equate to state control over religion. The State must remain secular. Religions must retain their autonomy. And citizens must be free to practice their faith without impediment.

Therefore, I would not necessarily advocate for a “Ministry of Religion,” which might suggest the State becoming a manager of spiritual affairs. Instead, I would champion a republican institution tasked with transparently and equitably organizing the interactions between the State and religious groups. For Sénégal cannot pretend that religion does not exist.

The question is no longer whether to institutionalize religious matters, but how to do so without losing the unique character of Senegalese secularism. In my opinion, the correct answer lies in one principle: do not institutionalize faith. Institutionalize the relationships *with* faith. This is the only path that can reconcile republican secularism, religious freedom, interfaith equity, and the autonomy of religious communities.