When Niger’s military government moved to take full control of its uranium sector after the July 2023 coup, it promised a clean break from Orano, the French group that had run the country’s mines for more than fifty years. The Somaïr joint venture was nationalised, the Imouraren permit was stripped away, and Niamey began courting a new set of partners — Russia most visibly, but also China, Iran, and eventually several Western investors.
That shift has triggered a fierce public argument inside Niger and well beyond its borders. Supporters call it a long-overdue assertion of sovereignty over a strategic resource. Critics warn that political control of a mine is not the same thing as a functioning market, and that the country may be trading one dependency for several murkier ones. Nearly two years on, the honest answer to the central question — does Niger now sell its uranium on better terms than it did under Orano? — remains frustratingly incomplete.
What can be said is this: Niamey’s bargaining position has clearly widened. Whether that translates into higher net revenue for the state, however, is not something the available evidence can yet prove. And a string of confidential negotiations, reported but never formally confirmed, has left a cloud of suspicion hanging over the whole affair.
The break with Orano: more sovereignty, a weaker industry
The rupture between Niamey and Orano is not just diplomatic. It is industrial and financial.
Orano lost operational control of its Nigerien activities in December 2024, and the Somaïr — the historic operator of the Arlit mine — was nationalised on 19 June 2025. The French group, which held 63.4 percent of Somaïr against the Nigerien state’s 36.6 percent, disputes the move and has launched several international arbitration proceedings.
The problem for Niamey is that taking over a mine does not automatically hand you a market. Niger’s output has fallen sharply over the past decade, from 4,116 tonnes in 2015 to just 962 tonnes in 2024, according to figures reported in 2026. The country now has only one mine in production, while several projects remain undeveloped.
In other words, mining sovereignty has advanced faster than the country’s industrial and commercial capacity.
Uranium prices: beware the false case against Orano
A widely repeated claim compares a supposed “French price” with today’s global market price. That comparison is misleading.
Uranium does not work like oil: there is no single exchange setting a daily price at which every producer sells. Contracts are negotiated directly between producers, intermediaries and nuclear utilities, with formulas that can blend spot indices and long-term prices. Historical data nevertheless offer a useful reference point.
In 2020, available figures indicated that Niger received roughly 48.1 billion CFA francs for 1,113 tonnes from Cominak and 103.3 billion CFA francs for 1,879 tonnes from Somaïr. For Somaïr, that worked out to about 83.75 euros per kilogram of uranium, based on the public data of the time.
A separate analysis drawing on Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative data estimated that uranium bought from Orano had recently been around 45,000 CFA francs per kilogram — roughly 33 dollars per pound — while some European or Japanese buyers were said to have paid around 60,000 CFA francs per kilogram.
The market has since changed dramatically. In 2025, the average spot price paid by European utilities was 70.33 dollars per pound, up from 53.59 dollars in 2024. The average price of multi-year contracts, however, was much lower, at 54.70 dollars per pound.
By late September 2026, the spot indicator stood at around 89.63 dollars per pound, while the long-term price reached roughly 96.50 dollars per pound.
The conclusion matters: Niger today operates in a far more favourable price environment than it did in the early 2020s. But that does not prove that Niamey is actually selling its uranium at 90 or 100 dollars per pound. This is where the file turns opaque.
The mysterious 170-million-dollar Russian deal
The most spectacular case concerns the stockpile of yellowcake accumulated at Arlit.
In 2025, several French sources claimed that Niamey had struck an agreement with Russia covering 1,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate for around 170 million dollars. If confirmed, that would work out to about 170 dollars per kilogram, or nearly 77 dollars per pound.
That price would be below the spot price of late September 2026, but comparable to some contractual levels seen on the international market. The trouble is that the deal has never been officially confirmed by either side. The Nigerien government denied selling the stock, and Rosatom said it was not party to the agreement in question.
Yet the affair is not simply a rumour without material traces. In November 2025, around 1,000 tonnes of yellowcake were indeed loaded onto trucks at Arlit. About thirty vehicles then headed for Niamey under military escort. The convoy ended up stranded at the capital’s airport.
This is precisely where the grey zone begins. A physical transfer of that scale is not, by itself, proof of a sale. But it does show that the Nigerien authorities were actively working to commercialise the stock. The 170-million-dollar figure should therefore be presented as an allegation documented by several sources, not as an established contract.
And Iran? Confidential talks that left traces
The Russian file is not the first opaque episode. In 2024, Le Monde revealed confidential negotiations between Niamey and Tehran over 300 tonnes of yellowcake, valued at around 56 million dollars. Several Western and Nigerien sources confirmed the talks took place.
The Nigerien government denied concluding a sale. A government adviser nevertheless acknowledged that Iran had wanted to buy the 300 tonnes, explaining that Niamey had refused because no stock was available.
Again, three notions must be kept apart: negotiation, agreement and executed contract. The available information establishes that negotiations happened. It does not prove that a clandestine delivery took place.
Russia and China: new allies or new customers?
Russia is now Niamey’s most visible geopolitical partner in the nuclear sector. In December 2025, the Nigerien company Timersoi National Uranium Company signed a cooperation agreement with Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of the Russian group Rosatom, to explore deposits and eventually develop new mines.
China, too, has shown interest in the Arlit stockpile. In 2025, sources spoke of discussions potentially covering around 1,000 tonnes. But these new partners do not necessarily guarantee better prices. Above all, they give Niger more negotiating options. That is a fundamental difference.
So is Niger selling its uranium better today?
At this stage, the most honest answer is: not yet demonstrated.
Niger now has three advantages it did not previously enjoy with the same intensity. First, the international uranium price is much higher. Second, Niamey is seeking to diversify its partners — Russia and China, but also Canadian, Australian and American players. Third, the government now directly controls a key part of the mining chain.
But three weaknesses constrain the strategy: falling production, logistical problems and the legal uncertainty created by the dispute with Orano. In September 2025, an ICSID arbitral tribunal ordered Niger not to sell or transfer to third parties the uranium produced by Somaïr that is subject to the litigation. Political sovereignty alone does not create a solvent market.
The Nigerien paradox
Niger now wants to sell its uranium “at the best price”. But to do that, it must be able to produce steadily, transport its ore safely, attract capital and legally guarantee its contracts. The country is precisely trying to rebuild that capacity. In 2026, it even created the Teloua Safeguarding Uranium Mining Company, intended to replace the nationalised Somaïr.
At the same time, new Western investors are returning: in September 2026, the United States approved up to 414 million dollars in financing for the Dasa project of Global Atomic, a Canadian company. That may be the real turning point. Niger is not simply replacing France with Russia. It is gradually trying to turn its uranium into a lever of competition between several powers.
For now, however, no public evidence allows the claim that new contracts bring Niger more than those signed under Orano. International price levels are higher, yes. Negotiating options are more numerous, yes. But the contracts actually signed, their pricing formulas, the premiums, the logistical costs and the net share returning to the state remain largely opaque.
As for “secret contracts”, there are confidential negotiations and accusations serious enough to justify investigations, notably around Iran and Russia. But to speak of definitively established secret deals would, as things stand, go beyond the available evidence.
The real issue for Niamey is therefore no longer just whom to sell its uranium to. It is at what price, with what guarantees, and above all what share of that value will actually stay in Niger.
