The Algerian delegation’s arrival at the Benin Deal Room 2026, held in Cotonou from 16 to 18 September, was meant to signal a new era of South-South economic partnership. Instead, it has reignited a heated debate across West Africa: how can regional trade flourish when key borders remain sealed? The ongoing closure between Niger and Benin — despite months of quiet diplomacy — has become the most visible symbol of the gap between Algeria’s deal-making ambitions and the region’s fractured reality.
What the Cotonou summit really exposed
For three days, Cotonou became a marketplace for investors eyeing Benin’s growth prospects. The Benin Deal Room 2026, organised under the Beninese government’s auspices, brought together institutional investors, development finance institutions, project promoters, strategic companies and public officials around a portfolio of more than twenty projects.
Announced financing needs ranged between $2 billion and $3 billion, spanning agro-industry, manufacturing, infrastructure, logistics and energy. The stated goal was not merely to host another economic forum, but to connect capital directly with projects mature enough to move into concrete deals.
That logic explains why Algeria’s presence mattered. A multisectoral national delegation — including representatives from the pharmaceutical industry, energy and renewables, plus heads of state-owned groups such as the CEO of Saidal and the head of the Algerian Electrical and Gas Industries Company (SAIEG), a Sonelgaz subsidiary — took part in the proceedings.
For Algiers, the stakes went well beyond protocol. The aim was to identify markets, forge industrial alliances and build partnerships capable of anchoring Algerian firms in West Africa for the long haul.
From political diplomacy to economic deal-making
This shift reflects a broader evolution in Algeria’s Africa policy. After years of prioritising political, diplomatic and security cooperation, Algiers is now seeking to strengthen the economic dimension of its continental presence.
Benin’s context is particularly favourable. The country wants to accelerate industrialisation and leverage its geographic position — notably through the Port of Cotonou and the Glo-Djigbé Industrial Zone — to develop local processing, logistics and regional value chains.
For Algerian companies, this dynamic could open doors in several areas.
Pharmaceuticals is one. The expertise accumulated by Algeria’s drug industry could find new outlets in West Africa through exports, distribution and, eventually, local production and technology transfers.
Electricity is another strategic sector. Sonelgaz and its subsidiaries’ know-how in generation, transmission, distribution and energy solutions can meet the needs of a continent facing a major energy access deficit. Renewables also open a vast field of cooperation, especially in Sahelian territories where solar power can be a major electrification lever.
The challenge is to move beyond a classic commercial relationship — selling Algerian products to African clients — toward a more ambitious logic: producing, investing, training and transferring skills in Africa.
The Niger paradox: cooperating without moving
But this ambition collides with a geopolitical reality that goes beyond Algiers-Cotonou relations.
Niger is today one of Algeria’s strategic partners. The two countries have strengthened cooperation in security, transport and energy. In June 2026, Algeria launched work on its section of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, a project meant to link Nigeria to Europe via Niger and Algeria.
In August, energy cooperation was further highlighted with the start of drilling at the Kafra oil block in northern Niger by Sonatrach, in the presence of the Algerian and Nigerien prime ministers. The project is presented as potentially fostering road infrastructure, logistics, energy and trade between southern Algeria and the Agadez region.
On security, Algiers even went as far as providing military support to Niger in August 2026, at the request of Niamey’s authorities.
And yet, a few hundred kilometres to the west, the border between Niger and Benin remains closed.
This closure, inherited from the crisis triggered by the July 2023 coup, now stands as one of the main contradictions of regional integration. Talks between Cotonou and Niamey in 2026 yielded progress on security, transit and some economic and legal aspects, but no firm reopening timeline had been confirmed by late September.
For Niamey, security concerns remain central. But the situation carries an economic cost: goods destined for Niger from the Port of Cotonou must take alternative routes, adding delays and expenses.
A closed border at the heart of an integration dream
The Niger-Benin case raises a fundamental question: can South-South cooperation truly exist without fluid borders, transport and trade?
The paradox is all the more striking because Benin and Niger have every interest in preserving economic ties. Cotonou has historically been a key maritime outlet for landlocked West African hinterland countries. For Niger, access to Beninese port infrastructure is an important element of its supply chain.
The border closure turns a bilateral problem into a regional issue. It weakens logistics chains, raises transport costs and reduces companies’ ability to plan their markets across multiple countries.
For Algeria, which wants to expand trade with Africa, this situation is a warning. Geographic diversification of exports cannot be separated from building secure, functional corridors.
Algeria has a major asset: its geographic depth. Developing trans-Saharan routes, the Algiers-Lagos highway and the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline can help bring North Africa closer to West Africa. But these infrastructures will only deliver their full effect if they operate within a regional environment that allows regular movement of goods, capital and skills.
Toward a new generation of South-South partnerships
Algeria’s presence at the Benin Deal Room 2026 thus takes on a wider dimension. It reflects a desire to build African cooperation based less on declarations than on identifiable projects, investments and shared economic interests.
That is probably where the real challenge of South-South cooperation lies. It is no longer just about African countries trading more with each other, but about building African value chains together: producing medicines in Africa, developing electrical equipment in Africa, processing raw materials on the continent, financing African infrastructure and creating African jobs.
Benin wants to attract capital. Algeria seeks new markets and wants to leverage its industrial capacities. Niger holds considerable energy and mining resources and represents a strategic space between North and West Africa. These interests could be complementary.
But economic complementarity requires a precondition: political trust.
The gradual reopening of borders, especially between Niger and Benin, would be more than a bilateral gesture. It would signal an Africa capable of overcoming political divisions to prioritise shared economic interests.
Algeria at its African crossroads
By attending the Cotonou gathering, Algiers appears to have chosen to stop viewing the African market as a simple extension of its exports and instead treat it as a strategic space for investment and partnership.
The challenge now will be turning contacts made in Deal Rooms into contracts, industrial facilities and lasting projects.
Benin can be a gateway. Niger can be a strategic corridor. The Sahel can become a space of complementarities. But without movement, interconnected infrastructure and political stability, ambitions will remain fragmented.
The message from Cotonou is therefore twofold: Africa now attracts African capital itself; the question is whether borders will become the limits of that new ambition.
