Fierce fighting broke out on the morning of Friday, 9 October 2026 between the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-S) in the Tessit area, along the border with Burkina Faso. The battle has triggered a fresh wave of public debate across the Sahel, raising uncomfortable questions about what the military authorities of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger can actually show for their repeated security pledges.
Rival claims, one shared reality
Sources close to JNIM say the rival organisation suffered heavy losses on several fronts. Sources close to IS-S, for their part, claim JNIM was defeated and that new territory was seized.
These competing accounts do not, on their own, establish the true outcome of the fighting. They do, however, point to a troubling reality: armed groups are still battling each other for territory across the Sahel, while civilian populations remain exposed to insecurity, forced displacement and the wider fallout of this war.
An enduring presence that the juntas can no longer talk around
The clashes lay bare a major contradiction in the security narrative of the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which are grouped within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Since taking power, the military authorities have made the reconquest of sovereignty and the fight against terrorism central pillars of their legitimacy. Yet the persistence of armed groups — and their ability to move, organise and fight on the ground — raises doubts about how effective those strategies have really been.
The core problem is not merely the existence of terrorist groups, but the persistent difficulty states face in preventing them from putting down lasting roots on their own soil. Tessit illustrates this: while the two organisations jostle for position, civilians keep bearing the cost of an insecurity that refuses to fade, despite repeated promises to restore order.
AES authorities regularly denounce foreign interference and, depending on the circumstances, accuse certain neighbouring countries of facilitating the activities of armed groups or serving as rear bases for their fighters. Such accusations must be weighed against verifiable evidence. The presence of terrorist groups on a country’s territory does not, by itself, prove that its leaders support or knowingly harbour them.
One question nevertheless remains unavoidable: how can military governments justify their security record when armed groups continue to operate in areas where the state struggles to restore lasting authority?
Between sovereignty rhetoric and conditions on the ground
One of the main challenges now facing the Sahel’s military regimes is to show that their strategic choices are delivering concrete results. Switching military partners, pushing out Western forces and drawing closer to Russia were all presented as ways to regain control of the security situation.
Yet these shifts alone are not enough to eliminate armed groups. Persistent difficulties in Mali and the violence hitting various parts of the Sahel are a reminder that counterterrorism also depends on intelligence, an effective administrative presence, the protection of civilians and the ability of security forces to hold recaptured territory.
A United Nations report published in 2026 describes sustained activity by JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel, particularly in the Tessit and Ménaka areas of Mali, as well as in parts of Niger and Burkina Faso. It also notes clashes between these organisations over territorial control.
This reality undermines narratives that frame security difficulties as the exclusive product of outside manoeuvring. Regional and cross-border factors are real, but they do not absolve any government of accountability for its own results.
The political stakes of staying in power
Managing the terrorist threat also raises a broader political question: how can persistent insecurity be prevented from becoming a permanent argument for concentrating power and delaying a return to normal constitutional order?
It would be reckless to assert, without evidence, that AES leaders knowingly harbour or nurture terrorist groups in order to stay in power. Such an accusation requires concrete, independent and verifiable elements.
It is legitimate, however, to question the political consequences of a situation in which the security threat remains omnipresent while military authorities continue to present counterterrorism as a major justification for their governance.
The distinction matters: denouncing the possible political exploitation of insecurity is not the same as claiming that leaders themselves engineer that insecurity. The first is political analysis; the second demands proof.
Populations want results, not just explanations
In Tessit, the opposing claims of JNIM and the Islamic State do not yet allow anyone to say with certainty which group won the 9 October clashes. But that uncertainty changes nothing about the central issue: these organisations remain capable of mounting operations and contesting control of certain areas.
For residents, the consequences are very real. Insecurity hampers travel, disrupts economic activity and complicates access to essential services. Talk of sovereignty, international alliances and external enemies cannot indefinitely substitute for measurable results on the ground.
The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger therefore face a simple demand: demonstrate their capacity to protect populations, prevent armed groups from establishing a lasting presence and restore an effective public presence in affected areas.
Sovereignty is not measured only by the partners a state chooses or the foreign forces it sends home. It is also measured by a state’s ability to protect its citizens on its own territory.
As long as armed groups continue to fight over territory in the Sahel, AES authorities will have to answer one question: beyond rhetoric and accusations aimed abroad, what lasting results can they show to guarantee the security of their people?
