key figures: the human cost of militant violence in 2025

From January to November 2025, the toll of political violence and militant activity in West Africa has been staggering:

• more than 10,000 fatalities recorded in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger due to political violence
• 30 foreign nationals kidnapped in Mali (22) and Niger (8)
• Benin saw a nearly 70% increase in fatalities compared to the same period in 2024

how militant groups are waging economic warfare in the Sahel

In 2025, jihadist militant organizations intensified their campaigns across the central Sahel, posing severe threats to the stability of military-led governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) have expanded their operations, consolidating control over key areas while extending their reach into neighboring regions.

JNIM has implemented strategic economic blockades in Mali, particularly in Kayes and Nioro du Sahel, disrupting trade and transportation networks that connect Bamako to surrounding regions. These blockades have resulted in severe fuel shortages and sharp price increases nationwide. The group’s strategy aims to cripple the economy, undermine government authority, and destabilize the military regime. The consequences of JNIM’s offensives and military counterattacks have led to unprecedented violence in Kayes, Sikasso, and Segou, with casualty rates reaching their highest levels since data collection began in 1997.

In Burkina Faso, JNIM has maintained relentless pressure on military forces and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). In May, the group briefly captured the provincial capitals of Djibo and Diapaga in rapid succession, signaling a significant enhancement in its military capabilities. September saw one of the deadliest attacks on Burkina Faso’s military when a convoy near Koubel-Alpha in Soum province was ambushed, resulting in approximately 90 soldiers killed. These developments highlight JNIM’s growing strength and its intent to challenge state control by targeting economic lifelines and key transit routes.

Niger, while experiencing less intense violence than its neighbors, is increasingly vulnerable to militant incursions. Militant activity has spread beyond traditional hotspots into the southern Dosso and northern Agadez regions. ISSP, mirroring JNIM’s tactics, has escalated attacks on critical infrastructure, particularly the Benin-Niger oil pipeline in the Dosso and Tahoua regions along the Nigerian border. The abduction of a U.S. citizen in Niamey on October 21 underscores the expanding reach of militants into urban centers previously considered secure.

Both JNIM and ISSP have launched extensive kidnapping campaigns targeting foreigners, contributing to record-breaking numbers of abductions in Mali and Niger. JNIM’s primary focus has been on industrial facilities, mining operations, and transportation routes, while ISSP has broadened its targets to include Western nationals and foreign laborers, with most incidents occurring in Niger. These operations signal a shift toward high-value hostage-taking and the outsourcing of abductions to criminal networks.

the rise of a new conflict frontline in coastal west africa

A defining development for 2026 is the emergence of a critical frontline in the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands. This area has become a strategic focal point for both Sahelian and Nigerian militant factions, reshaping the conflict landscape and posing significant challenges to regional stability.

Throughout 2025, JNIM and ISSP have deepened their presence in this tri-border region, transforming it into a hotspot with far-reaching implications. Northern Benin experienced its deadliest year on record after JNIM intensified cross-border operations from eastern Burkina Faso in April, culminating in the deaths of over 50 soldiers in Park W. By midyear, the group had advanced further south into the Borgou department along the Nigerian border, marking a significant southward expansion beyond its traditional strongholds in Atacora and Alibori. JNIM also claimed responsibility for its first attack in Nigeria in late October. ISSP, meanwhile, has reinforced its foothold in southwestern Niger, moving closer to Gaya on the Benin border and extending operations into Nigeria’s Sokoto and Kebbi states.

The convergence of Sahelian and Nigerian militant groups represents a turning point. Previously distinct conflict zones in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are now merging with theaters in Nigeria, creating a single, interconnected conflict environment stretching from western Mali to Nigeria’s northwestern states. In 2026, this region is expected to become a major arena of competition among militant factions, including JNIM, ISSP, Ansaru, Mahmuda, and various Islamic State affiliates. Increased interaction among these groups is likely as their operational areas overlap, leading to evolving dynamics and new patterns of violence.

While militant expansion reshapes the southern front of the Sahel conflict, military regimes in the central Sahel face mounting internal and external pressures. In Mali and Burkina Faso, JNIM’s sustained offensives, blockades, and sieges have eroded state control and exposed critical vulnerabilities. The fuel and transport embargo in Mali continues to strain the economy, hinder the movement of goods and people, and intensify civilian hardship, undermining the regime’s legitimacy. Prolonged disruption risks exacerbating divisions within the armed forces and triggering unrest that the junta may struggle to manage.

Burkina Faso faces comparable challenges. Years of sustained conflict have stretched the army and VDP to their limits. JNIM’s temporary capture of major towns not only highlights the group’s strategic and tactical advancements but also signals its potential to target regional capitals such as Fada N’Gourma in the east, given the state’s inability to defend provincial and departmental centers effectively. Continued high casualties and territorial losses could fuel internal dissent and coup pressures, mirroring the factors that led to the downfall of previous governments.

Across the central Sahel, state authority is steadily eroding despite promises from military regimes to restore security. JNIM and ISSP now contest sovereignty over vast rural territories, where they enforce their own social order, impose taxes, and control access to livelihoods. Their influence is encroaching on major population centers once thought to be insulated from militant activity. ISSP’s incursions into Ayorou and Tillaberi, along with operations in Niamey, demonstrate that no urban area is beyond militant reach.

Local self-defense groups, vital to state counter-insurgency efforts, are under unprecedented strain. In Mali, many Dozo militias have been disarmed or forced into agreements with JNIM, leaving communities dependent on militant-enforced security and economic arrangements. In Burkina Faso, the VDP—once central to the Traoré regime’s mobilization strategy—has suffered heavy losses and remains largely on the defensive, limiting the state’s ability to reclaim territory. As these groups weaken, militants are likely to expand their territorial control further.

Russia’s military partnership with Sahelian states has achieved limited success. The transition from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps left large areas vulnerable, as the Africa Corps operates with a more limited scope and has struggled to prevent military advances. However, toward the end of 2025, the Africa Corps’ role shifted toward securing fuel convoys and critical supply routes in southern Mali, where JNIM’s embargo was beginning to lose momentum. This military partnership is expected to remain crucial in 2026, as the Africa Corps provides essential logistical and aerial support to help the junta maintain control over major transit routes and urban centers amid ongoing security challenges.

The combination of sustained militant pressure, weakened militias, and declining state capacity and legitimacy heightens the risk of political destabilization in the central Sahel. If either the Malian or Burkinabe military regimes succumb to internal divisions or popular unrest, a regional domino effect could unfold, placing neighboring governments in increasingly precarious positions. If current trends persist, 2026 may witness deeper political instability and territorial fragmentation across the central Sahel and its southern borders.

looking ahead: what 2026 holds for the Sahel and coastal West Africa

Militant groups are increasingly expanding their influence beyond the Sahel, challenging regional cooperation and security frameworks. The merging of Sahelian and coastal West African conflicts into a single, interconnected crisis is likely to intensify competition among militant factions, reshaping the security landscape and threatening the stability of military-led regimes.

The growing convergence of Sahelian and Nigerian militant groups signals a new phase in the conflict, with overlapping operational areas and evolving dynamics. As these groups interact more frequently, the potential for increased violence and new patterns of confrontation across the borderlands becomes more pronounced. The central Sahel’s military regimes face immense pressure to counter these threats while addressing internal vulnerabilities and maintaining public support.

With state authority eroding and local defense groups struggling, the risk of further territorial fragmentation and political instability looms large. International partnerships, such as the Russia-backed Africa Corps, may provide temporary relief but are unlikely to resolve the underlying structural challenges. The coming year will be critical in determining whether the region can stabilize or if the cycle of violence and instability will deepen.