The JNIM claims it took full control of several Burkinabè militia positions in Silmossin, near the town of Dédougou, on the evening of Friday, September 25, 2026. The claim came on the same day the jihadist group said it had overrun two positions used by the Burkinabè army and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) in Aoréma and Klio, in the country’s north.
Why the repetition matters more than any single claim
Setting aside whether each individual claim is accurate, the steady drumbeat of these announcements raises a more fundamental question: how effective is the security strategy put in place since Captain Ibrahim Traoré came to power?
For years, the Burkinabè authorities have presented territorial reconquest, the buildup of national forces and the mobilization of the VDP as the pillars of a new security doctrine. But a military strategy cannot be judged solely by the number of soldiers deployed, operations announced or territories declared recaptured. It is measured above all by the state’s ability to hold its positions over time, protect civilians, secure road corridors and prevent armed groups from returning to areas that were retaken.
It is precisely on that question of duration that the difficulties persist.
The limits of relying on volunteer fighters
The heavy reliance on the VDP has widened the defense footprint, but it has also placed non-professional fighters in particularly vulnerable positions. Analyses of JNIM operations consistently point to factors such as intelligence, mobility, logistics, surveillance of key routes, coordination between units and most critically the ability to hold forward positions over the long term.
The problem therefore runs deeper than any single battle won or lost. Retaking a position does not necessarily mean durably restoring state authority. A genuinely secured area must allow administrations to function, schools to reopen, markets to resume activity, farmers to return to their fields and displaced populations to come home.
That is the ground on which the Traoré government’s security record deserves to be examined with greater rigor.
A doctrine built on sovereignty and mass mobilization
Since taking power, Captain Ibrahim Traoré has made sovereignty, popular mobilization and military reconquest central elements of his political message. Official communications regularly emphasize the successes of national forces. But when armed groups continue to claim attacks on military or VDP positions, those announcements must be weighed against what is actually observable on the ground.
Burkina Faso’s foreign minister himself acknowledged as recently as September 25 the need to draw lessons from what “has not worked so far,” stressing the importance of preventing the recruitment of young people by terrorist groups.
That statement matters: it shows that even within official circles, the purely military response is recognized as insufficient.
An adaptable insurgency and a shifting battlefield
Burkina Faso is facing a particularly adaptable insurgency. The JNIM has developed capabilities in mobility, intelligence, financing and the use of new technologies, while its operations continue to pressure security forces and civilian populations. ACLED has highlighted the evolution of jihadist tactics, the growing use of drones and the difficulties Sahelian states face in permanently preventing armed groups from reoccupying certain areas.
The real challenge for Ibrahim Traoré is therefore no longer simply to produce a narrative of victory. It is to demonstrate, with figures and results, that the strategy pursued since 2022 is actually reducing violence over the long term and restoring state authority.
Political communication can present advances. The ground imposes a different requirement: lasting security for the population.
What the Silmossin claims reveal about forward positions
If the JNIM’s claims in Silmossin were to be confirmed, they would signal yet another vulnerability in forward positions. But even before any confirmation, the multiplication of claims against Burkinabè positions raises a legitimate question: why do certain areas remain so difficult to secure despite increases in troop numbers, equipment and resources devoted to counterterrorism?
That is where the true assessment of Ibrahim Traoré’s security record lies.
The debate should not be limited to slogans, images of military operations or declarations of victory. It must focus on verifiable indicators: durably secured territories, attacks on civilians, military losses, freedom of movement, the return of displaced people, the functioning of public services and the ability of national forces to hold recaptured positions.
Without transparent data to measure these elements, the gap between the official narrative and information from the field will continue to fuel questions.
And in a war against armed groups, it is not slogans that settle the debate: it is durable results on the ground.
By Thérèse Nguimfack — State political analyst
