West Africa’s security landscape: navigating Mali’s crisis and shifting alliances

As Mali faces profound instability, its regional partners appear hesitant. Neither the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — established for collective security among Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — nor ECOWAS, which Bamako recently exited, seem capable of exerting significant influence. Amidst strategic silences, perfunctory condemnations, and intricate political calculations, West Africa reveals a strategic vacuum. Bakary Sambe, President of the Timbuktu Institute and research professor at Gaston-Berger University in Saint-Louis, offers insights into this period reshaping West African security dynamics.

Regarding the April 25 attacks, what is the current understanding of the situation in Mali?

Bakary Sambe: The coordinated assault was devastating, particularly in Kati, where Defense Minister Sadio Camara tragically lost his life, subsequently replaced by General Assimi Goïta himself. However, at this juncture, it’s crucial to refrain from speculating about a potential regime change or the fall of Bamako. Life, though challenging, persists, and Malians, long accustomed to crises, once again demonstrate remarkable resilience. This holds true despite the ongoing communiqué battle between military authorities, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), and JNIM.

What actions are Burkina Faso and Niger, Mali’s AES allies, taking?

Captain Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso officially denounced a “monstrous plot.” While some perceive this reaction as subdued, Ouagadougou’s stance is primarily rooted in pragmatism. Burkina Faso remains deeply engrossed in its own internal security challenges, leading to its relatively withdrawn posture. Just last week, numerous soldiers lost their lives in attacks on Burkinabè soil. For instance, during the fuel blockade in Mali in late 2025, Burkina Faso initially offered logistical support until its own domestic front became too complex to manage.

Legally, Articles 5 and 6 of the Liptako-Gourma Charter, which solidifies the alliance among these three Sahelian nations, are frequently likened to NATO’s mutual assistance principle. This framework is quite clear. However, for both Burkina Faso and Niger, the pervasive internal security threats restrict its practical implementation. On paper, the AES functions as a confederation that has yet to achieve its full strategic maturity, particularly regarding its capacity to pool resources and forces. This week, Nigerien authorities reluctantly declared a national day of “fasting” and prayers to combat terrorism.

Mali’s crisis underscores the limitations of regional alliances.

ECOWAS has called for “regional mobilization,” but what is its objective, especially after Bamako’s departure from the organization in January 2025?

This declaration must be understood within the recent regional context. It follows a significant meeting in Lomé, Togo, dedicated to the Sahel. For the first time in years, ministers from AES member states, alongside representatives from ECOWAS, the African Union, France, the European Union, and Russia, convened at the same table.

Beyond the immediate crisis in Mali, it’s vital to acknowledge diplomatic efforts aimed at counteracting regional fragmentation and the escalating security situation of recent years. Within this framework, ECOWAS seeks to project a new image, distancing itself from the regional body that once considered military intervention in Niger.

During the Lomé meeting, Mali’s Foreign Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, affirmed that channels for dialogue and exchange remain open, strictly adhering to the principle of respecting the sovereignty of Sahelian states. Through these overtures, ECOWAS intends to gradually re-establish its presence in the Sahelian arena.

The African Union, meanwhile, highlights the significance of “continental mechanisms” to prevent further security destabilization in the Central Sahel. What exactly does the continental organization refer to?

Once again, the formation of the AES, anchored by the Liptako-Gourma Charter, inadvertently disrupted the existing regional security framework. This architecture, however, had never been particularly effective in counter-terrorism efforts. The reason is straightforward: for over a decade, regional organizations were largely sidelined from security matters, with the G5 Sahel (dissolved in 2023) taking clear precedence.

Despite their historical distance from Sahelian security operations, the African Union and ECOWAS continue to pursue the ideal of an intervention force, or at least a joint force. Yet, this ambition struggles to materialize on the ground. By the end of 2026, ECOWAS envisions deploying a 1,650-strong anti-terrorism brigade, but a broader armed or peacekeeping mission remains highly uncertain for now.

Nonetheless, there’s a growing realization that attempting to isolate the Central Sahel from West Africa in the fight against armed groups is a strategic misstep. In the face of divisive issues, security must be managed collaboratively through intelligence sharing and resource pooling. The shock of April 25 has brought the indispensable need for security cooperation, even minimal, back to the forefront.

Russia faces a strategic setback.

Speaking of external actors, Washington has intensified its visits to the Sahel in recent months. What stance might the United States adopt concerning the Malian crisis?

Beyond Donald Trump’s relative disinterest in Africa, we observe a discernible resurgence of American diplomatic engagement, with senior officials returning to the Sahel, even to Niger, from where US military personnel had been expelled. This shift is simply because the stakes have evolved.

Concurrently, the situation in Mali highlights a complete strategic reversal for Russia, most starkly evidenced by the death of Defense Minister Sadio Camara. He was widely regarded as the most Russophile figure among the military leaders who ascended to power in Mali. The departure of Africa Corps paramilitaries from Kidal serves as another powerful indicator.

Russia’s faltering influence in the Sahel is not merely military; it carries significant symbolic weight. A foundational myth has crumbled: that of Russia’s capacity to guarantee the protection and security of regimes. Moscow’s diplomatic and security credibility could suffer a substantial blow.

Conversely, if the United States perceives an opportunity to challenge, or even displace, Russia in the Sahel, I believe Washington will leverage geostrategic and diplomatic arguments to establish a more pronounced presence in the region, particularly in Mali, with resource considerations as an underlying factor.

Does the Malian crisis now pose a threat to the Gulf of Guinea nations?

For coastal nations, it is primarily the dynamics within Burkina Faso that concern the central authorities of Togo, Benin, Ghana, or Côte d’Ivoire. Presently, should Mali’s security situation worsen, the repercussions would likely be felt more acutely in Senegal or Mauritania. Therefore, all eyes are on Ouagadougou. The apprehension of a Sahelian domino effect is highly relevant, as is the questioning of the AES’s future and institutional viability. Populations are seeking concrete solutions beyond mere rhetoric.

Meanwhile, Togo endeavors to forge a new “bridge with the Sahel,” to quote Togo’s Foreign Minister, Robert Dussey. It remains to be seen, over time, what this aspiration will entail.

The Sahel cannot be separated from West Africa.

Should we fear a domino effect after these attacks, particularly in Burkina Faso?

The Malian case is unique; assuming such an attack would replicate elsewhere would be premature. Crucially, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) does not operate in Burkina Faso. In Mali, the catalyst for the current crisis is a convergence of profound security issues in the North and political instability in Bamako.

Paradoxically, the severity of these attacks might generate a form of political capital for the ruling authorities. This is because whenever the issue of the North becomes critical or highly visible, it galvanizes the Malian population around its army, fostering a sense of territorial integrity. Rallying around the flag has rarely been stronger in Bamako in recent days, effectively dampening any dissenting voices that, in the current climate, might be perceived as contrary to the prevailing patriotism. The authorities no longer even require galvanizing communication efforts.

To revisit the domino effect, despite vast territories outside the central government’s control in Ouagadougou, there are, for now, no influential protest movements strong enough to bolster JNIM jihadists and destabilize Burkina Faso to a similar extent.