Russian mercenaries exploit central african republic’s conflict economy

The Central African Republic (CAR) has endured persistent instability since at least 2004, marked by a three-year civil war that engulfed the nation, followed by numerous years of fighting against insurgent groups. In an effort to restore order, the CAR government extended an invitation to Russian Wagner Group mercenaries to serve as trainers in early 2018.

By 2019, the Wagner Group had established a presence of over 1,000 mercenaries within the Central African Republic. These operatives became deeply integrated into the country’s political, economic, and social institutions, specifically targeting lucrative sectors such as gold extraction, diamond mining, and timber logging. This infiltration fostered the emergence of a conflict economy, where both the mercenaries and other factions capitalize on the nation’s ongoing chaos.

Wagner not only infiltrated local markets through force and intimidation but also secured a significant foothold within President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s government, even installing a Russian national as a senior security advisor.

In 2021, Wagner forces and government troops initiated a nationwide military endeavor. While presented as a stabilization campaign, this operation evolved from counter-insurgency into a broader process of territorial, political, and economic consolidation.

Today, the combined efforts of government and Wagner forces have transformed an economy that once sustained rebel groups into networks designed to bolster the Touadéra administration and enrich Russia.

Local elites, in collaboration with their foreign security partners, assimilated armed groups, and various economic actors, have wielded coercion and organized crime to consolidate their power, control vital resources, and advance their financial interests. This has effectively turned the Central African Republic into a platform for powerful transnational criminal networks. Among other nations exerting influence in CAR are the United Arab Emirates, Rwanda, and Turkey.

The participation of Russian mercenaries is inherently transactional. Their expanding presence aims to merge security, economic, and political control over natural resources to ensure Russia’s long-term influence in the region.

With Russian backing, President Touadéra has solidified his political authority. Concurrently, actors linked to Wagner and their allies have become deeply embedded in key ministries, security agencies, customs administration, and strategic resource sectors. Rather than fostering stability, the collaboration between Bangui and Moscow has intensified and systematized patterns of coercion, resource extraction, and predation.

While government gains against armed groups have occurred, they have not eliminated the “rapacity of conflict” within the mining sector, trade routes, or taxation. Instead, this exploitation has been redirected to government-linked actors, networks, and individuals within the government who now profit from these diverse sectors.

Russia has particularly benefited from the gold and fuel trade in the Central African Republic. Wagner, for instance, constructed an illicit fuel supply chain to finance its joint military operations with the government and its extensive mining operations.

The scale of Wagner’s involvement in CAR’s gold trade is striking, with particular emphasis on the “sheer mass and blatant volume” of gold extracted from the country. Interests controlled by Wagner are estimated to produce approximately 5 tons of gold annually.

This volume of gold holds an export value of around 250 million dollars, yet its value on the international market could easily reach 500 million dollars.

Starting in 2021, Russian and Rwandan forces successfully reclaimed crucial mining regions across the country, preventing armed groups from controlling these territories. This shift resulted in more artisanal gold being exported through official channels. In 2023, gold exports reached 1.7 tons. While projections for 2025 anticipated a total of approximately 2.5 tons, actual exports soared to 7 tons by the end of that year.

This significant figure “far exceeds the capacity of artisanal production,” suggesting it must include industrial-scale gold, most likely sourced from Wagner’s concessions.

While the security agreement between Russia and the Central African Republic may be somewhat unique on the continent, Russia’s broader ambition to seize African resources, particularly gold, is not. Russian forces have reportedly acquired over 2.5 billion dollars worth of African gold between February 2022, marking the invasion of Ukraine, and the end of 2023.

Russia’s aggressive pursuit of gold primarily targets the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan. Wagner has secured exclusive rights to the Ndassima mine, the largest in CAR. Russia also controls a major refinery and stands as the primary buyer of unprocessed Sudanese gold in that nation. In Mali, Russian mercenaries reportedly receive millions of dollars in cash each month from the ruling junta, which heavily relies on gold mining for the majority of its tax revenues. This entire arrangement circumvents international sanctions through “complex smuggling routes and commercial obfuscation tactics” employed across the Central African Republic and Sudan.