Military rulers in Burkina Faso dissolve political parties amid shifting alliances
The late January of 2026 marked the definitive end of partisan politics in Burkina Faso. On January 29, Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s administration dissolved all political parties, including those that had backed his September 2022 coup. This move followed their earlier suspension after Traoré seized power, with the junta framing it as part of a broader state restructuring to reduce social divisions.
In effect, the decree eliminates the remaining avenues for independent civic participation, centralizing authority under Traoré. Party assets were seized by the state, further consolidating the junta’s grip on power.
While the military leadership initially relied on enthusiastic civilian support, this decision starkly contrasts with its narrative of popular mobilization and revolutionary renewal. Yet this pattern is far from unprecedented.
why military coups in the Sahel turn against their civilian allies
Across the Sahel and beyond, history shows that initial civilian backing rarely translates into lasting political influence. Coups that begin with widespread public approval often end with the junta sidelining or repressing the very groups that helped secure its rule—a trend spanning decades.
Having studied military coups for nearly a decade, particularly the recent surge in West Africa, I’ve observed that once in power, juntas rarely share authority. Civilian groups serve a purpose in the early days of a takeover, providing crowds, legitimacy, and the appearance of popular demand. But their independent leaders, agendas, and demands soon become liabilities.
Military rulers prioritize control, and civilian allies—once useful—are swiftly marginalized or silenced. The enthusiasm of the early days should not be mistaken for a lasting mandate, nor should it be seen as an assurance of an inclusive transition.
the fleeting nature of civilian support in post-coup transitions
Contrary to common assumptions, many coups attract at least some civilian backing, with segments of the population actively endorsing or celebrating military interventions. During the recent wave of takeovers in the Sahel—from Mali to Niger—civil society groups, opposition parties, and other national actors often welcomed the moves, providing the new regimes with visible legitimacy.
Yet a familiar pattern emerges: as juntas consolidate power, they systematically exclude or suppress former allies. This dynamic has played out globally, from Sudan’s 1969 coup, where the Communist Party was initially aligned with the new leadership but later crushed, to Egypt’s 2013 takeover, where the Tamarod movement’s influence vanished as civic space shrank.
Mali’s m5-rfp: from coup backers to vocal critics
In Mali, the Mouvement du 5 juin – Rassemblement des forces patriotiques (M5-RFP), a coalition of opposition parties, religious leaders, and activists led by imam Mahmoud Dicko, was among the first to support Colonel Assimi Goïta’s 2020 coup against President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. The movement hoped to shape the transition but was swiftly sidelined when the junta formed its government, excluding key figures.
The marginalization deepened after Goïta’s second coup in May 2021, which consolidated military rule and further reduced the M5-RFP’s influence. What began as a tactical alliance ended in exclusion.
Guinea’s opposition: a cautionary tale of unkept promises
The 2021 coup in Guinea followed a similar trajectory. Opposition leaders, who had initially hailed General Mamady Doumbouya’s takeover, urged the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to refrain from sanctions and legitimized the intervention as necessary. Yet, like in Mali, the junta sidelined civilian allies, and within a year, opposition members were arrested for opposing their exclusion from the transition.
Against this backdrop, Burkina Faso’s recent dissolution of political parties fits a well-documented trend. Early civilian support does not guarantee sustained access or influence once military rulers solidify their control.