Mali security crisis: is dialogue with jihadists the only way out
Since the coordinated attacks on April 25 and 26 against Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré and Kidal, a question long considered taboo in Malian security debates has resurfaced: should discussions be opened with jihadist groups? The scale of the offensive jointly led by the Jnim (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and the Tuareg rebels of the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), has led several researchers and observers to conclude that the military-only approach has reached its limits.
From north to south of Mali, the offensive spread at an unprecedented pace. Armed groups launched coordinated attacks on military forces and symbols of state power in at least six cities, even reaching the outskirts of Bamako. For the first time, the Jnim and FLA operated in tandem, marking a significant shift in the conflict’s dynamics. Founded in November 2024 following the dissolution of the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP), the FLA claims the self-determination of Azawad, a vast territory in northern Mali.
These attacks have brutally exposed the vulnerabilities of Mali’s regime. Neither the junta led by Assimi Goïta nor its Russian allies in the Africa Corps appear capable of halting the armed groups’ advance. Across regional media and diplomatic circles, the possibility of negotiations with the Jnim is increasingly discussed openly, amid Bamako’s growing suffocation and the regional stalemate. However, the junta continues to publicly rule out any talks, insisting it will not engage in dialogue with terrorist armed groups and maintaining a strictly military stance despite the rapidly deteriorating security situation.
Since late April, pressures on the regime have intensified. In central Mali, violence has surged, with multiple villages in the Bankass region—including Kouroude and Dougara—attacked on Friday. According to local and security sources, the cumulative death toll from Wednesday and Friday’s attacks ranges between 70 and 80.
An unprecedented alliance, a wake-up call
The Jnim remains the driving force behind the jihadist movement in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. For the military juntas grouped under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the deadlock is tightening. Having seized power on promises of restoring security, they now struggle to contain an ever-expanding threat. In Mali, attacks have been creeping closer to the capital for nearly a year.
« Since July 2025, jihadists have targeted western Mali, attacking gold panning sites and industrial facilities. They then focused on the Bamako-Dakar corridor, strangling the capital, » notes Alain Antil, Director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Center at the Ifri. « What stands out this time is not just the scale of the operation but the deliberate choice of targets. Kati and Bamako lie at the heart of the regime, » adds Héni Nsaibia from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).
The death of Mali’s Defense Minister, Sadio Camara, in Kati dealt a severe blow to the government’s stability. Compounding this, the loss of Kidal—retaken in late 2023 and hailed as a major victory—represents a significant strategic setback.
Betting on suffocation
Even before this latest offensive, experts observed a shift in the Jnim’s strategy. « There is a clear intent to establish a stronger balance of power, not just through military pressure but to push Malian authorities toward negotiations, » Antil explains. The group now seeks to replicate locally what it aims to achieve nationally: economic blockades, gradual encirclement of cities, and pressure on logistical routes. « The Jnim is attempting to maintain an economic blockade around Bamako, » he emphasizes.
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, a Sahel expert, argues this tactic is part of a long-term strategy: « They are weakening the regime from within, exploiting fractures in the military system and prolonging the conflict. The Jnim no longer makes the imposition of Sharia a prerequisite for peace and claims to be open to dialogue. »
The rivalry with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) adds another layer of instability, as both groups vie for territorial control and influence.
Is negotiation the only viable option left?
Officially, Sahelian regimes reject any form of dialogue. « For the leaders of the AES, political negotiation is off the table. The discourse remains uncompromising, with military force as the sole response, » observes Antil. Yet the reality on the ground is far more nuanced. Excesses committed by state forces and their allies have eroded public trust. Between January 2024 and March 2025, nearly 1,500 civilians were killed by government forces and their Russian allies in Mali—nearly five times the number attributed to the Jnim, according to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). This violence fuels resentment and fuels jihadist recruitment.
States must accept the compromise of the brave.
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, Sahel expert
Faced with this impasse, an increasing number of experts advocate for a paradigm shift. « A purely military response is a dead end against the Sahel’s jihadist phenomenon. It must be combined with political negotiations, » argues Antil. Some of the Jnim’s demands—corruption, justice, access to resources—could serve as a basis for discussion, without overlooking their violence.
Ould Ethmane Elyessa goes further: « States must accept the compromise of the brave. The idea would be to integrate jihadists into the political process to expose their limitations. » However, he sets red lines: « The principles of gender equality and the secular nature of the state are non-negotiable. »
As jihadist offensives advance, the idea of negotiating ceases to be heresy and becomes a political necessity. For many experts in Mali, the question is no longer whether to engage in dialogue but how long Bamako can continue to refuse it.
