Mali rebels advance: can political talks prevent a jihadist takeover?
- Home
- Expressions by Montaigne
- Mali rebel offensive: can political talks prevent a jihadist takeover?
Mali rebels advance: can political talks prevent a jihadist takeover?
In Mali, the ruling junta led by Assimi Goïta—backed by Russia—has been weakened since a major offensive on April 25 by jihadists from the JNIM (affiliated with Al-Qaïda) and separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). Northern Mali could fall again, as it did in 2012. At the time, France intervened with Operation Barkhane, but today’s context differs sharply. What are the rebels’ goals? How might Russia react? How should European nations prepare for the potential rise of a jihadist proto-state in Mali? Jonathan Guiffard examines the risks for civilians and the escalating fragmentation of the Sahel.
On April 25, 2026, Mali witnessed a coordinated military assault unlike any seen in recent years. The JNIM (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, Al-Qaïda’s Sahelian branch) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) launched a joint offensive targeting five key cities: Bamako, Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, and Mopti. This marks the first large-scale coordinated attack since March 2012, when a similar coalition seized control of northern Mali under vastly different political circumstances.
What sets this offensive apart from the past? What short-term outcomes can be anticipated?
Current landscape: the most ambitious offensive in years
The offensive, launched on April 25, targeted strategic locations across Mali, including the capital Bamako and key northern cities like Kidal and Gao. This coordinated assault represents a shift from previous sporadic clashes, with both groups now operating in unison. Military positions held by Malian forces and Russian mercenaries came under heavy fire, particularly in Bamako, where key sites such as Kati’s military district and the airport were hit.
While the situation remains fluid, an initial assessment reveals significant shifts:
- Northern cities have fallen under rebel and jihadist control. Kidal, along with nearby towns like Tessalit and Anéfis, has been captured. Other strategic locations such as Ber, Bourem, Gourma-Rharous, Léré, Intahaka, and Tessit are now under siege, tightening the noose around Tombouctou and Gao. However, some Malian-Russian military bases, including those in Gao, Tombouctou, and Aguelhok, remain contested.
- Junta leaders have been directly impacted. The Defense Minister, General Sadio Camara, was killed, while several high-ranking officials, including the head of Mali’s State Security Agency (ANSE), General Modibo Koné, were wounded. President Assimi Goïta, the military junta’s leader, was reportedly evacuated to Turkey’s embassy before reappearing publicly on April 28 alongside Russian officials.
- Rumors of a power struggle within the junta, involving General Malick Diaw, circulated but were not confirmed. One certainty remains: the military leadership has been severely shaken by this assault.
The offensive mirrors the 2012 takeover in some ways, yet crucial differences set it apart:
- JNIM and FLA are coordinating openly. Unlike in previous years, where JNIM leaders like Iyad ag Ghali and Hamadoun Kouffa remained in the shadows, FLA representatives are now taking a visible role. Only high-ranking JNIM figure Sidan Ag Hitta has been spotted in Tessalit.
- Civilians and soldiers are being urged to surrender. Rather than executing captured Malian troops as in 2012, the groups are negotiating safe passages for soldiers to lay down their arms. The rebels position themselves as protectors of both civilians and military personnel against the Bamako junta.
- Negotiations with Russian mercenaries have been reported, allowing them to withdraw from key northern bases without resistance—a tactic reminiscent of Russia’s operations in Syria. Algeria may have facilitated these talks, likely in coordination with the FLA.
- The northern advance was enabled by simultaneous attacks in central Mali and Bamako. The prolonged assault on Bamako itself is unprecedented.
Negotiations with Russian mercenaries allowed them to withdraw from key northern bases without resistance, mirroring tactics seen in Syria.
This offensive signals a strategic evolution for both groups. Rather than aiming for direct territorial control, they are tightening their grip on cities and the junta, a strategy employed since 2020. By April 28, the JNIM had declared a full blockade of Bamako, burning supply trucks to demonstrate resolve while the junta organized limited convoys to sustain the capital.
Unlike 2012-2013, the Malian regime and its Russian allies have not collapsed entirely. They have attempted to regain the initiative through increased military operations. While Bamako’s situation is dire, it is not yet terminal. Civil society voices, including political figures like Oumar Mariko, former minister Mamadou Ismaïla Konaté, imam Mahmoud Dicko, and the Alliance of Sahel Democrats (ADS) based in Brussels, are once again calling for negotiations with armed groups, criticizing the junta’s reliance on military force alone.
The Islamic State’s Sahel Province (EIWS) launched an attack on Ménaka but was repelled by Russian-Malian forces. Though not part of the JNIM/FLA offensive, the EIWS remains a persistent threat in northeastern Mali.
A predictable crisis
As early as September 2022, analysis warned that Russia’s military support in Mali was illusory and counterproductive. Rather than addressing security challenges, the Russian presence exacerbated tensions, alienated civilians through repression, and failed to curb JNIM’s expansion.
- In January 2023, a forward-looking exercise anticipated the unfolding scenario, including: ‘Rising tensions between the CMA and FAMa/Wagner forces will reignite armed clashes in the north, with the CMA likely aligning with JNIM to reclaim control over the Niger River loop and possibly half of northern Mali.’
- ‘The fragmentation of central Mali will fuel regular clashes between the Macina Katibat and community defense militias, gradually placing the region under JNIM control.’
- ‘Bamako will be encircled in its outskirts… Unless the Malian army collapses entirely, the city is unlikely to fall as it did in 2012.’
- ‘The loss of control over Mali will heighten political tensions and ultimately lead to negotiations with JNIM to establish a durable truce, potentially amputating a large part of the country’s territory or imposing significant constitutional changes. Pressure from religious institutions will push political leaders toward negotiation.’
By November 2023, after the Malian army and Russian forces retook Kidal, it was clear that this ‘victory’ was short-lived. The CMA’s strategic retreat was a prelude to a future counteroffensive, culminating in the recent conquests.
These observations confirm that the current crisis was not a surprise. With this in mind, what are the most plausible short-term developments?
Short-term outlook
Militarily, the JNIM and FLA are likely to negotiate the withdrawal of Russian forces from northern bases before seizing Gao and Tombouctou, effectively partitioning Mali as occurred in 2012. Historical patterns suggest a similar trajectory: after capturing Kidal, parallel assaults on Gao and Tombouctou followed, with mass defections among Malian troops hastening the collapse. Under the current dual pressure—military and negotiation—the FAMa may continue to desert, given the breakdown in command chains and political turmoil in Bamako. If Russian forces withdraw from the two major northern cities, the conquest of Gao, Tombouctou, and the entire Niger River loop appears inevitable.
The only factor that could slow the rebels’ rapid advance or their ability to consolidate territorial control is the threat posed by Malian and Burkinabé drones. While the JNIM and FLA may destroy Malian drones, targeting Burkinabé or Nigerien drones presents a greater challenge.
The North is poised to fall under FLA and JNIM control, especially as their objectives have evolved. The FLA seeks de facto autonomy for the region without pursuing full political independence for Azawad, while the JNIM appears willing to implement a more moderate interpretation of Islamic law. This reduces the likelihood of a scenario like 2012, where jihadists violently seized cities and imposed strict governance. After their 2013 defeat by French forces, AQMI leaders advocated for a softer expansion strategy, focusing on preaching and limited application of Islamic law.
Controlling northern Mali will position the armed groups favorably, but they will face two additional fronts: the Islamic State in the Ménaka region and potential airstrikes by Malian and Burkinabé forces.
Unlike in 2012, JNIM fighters are also active in central Mali, and the northern offensive may be accompanied by new attacks on Malian garrisons in cities like Gossi, Boni, Hombori, Niafunké, Konna, Mopti, and Sévaré. Given the lack of FLA support in this region, operations may focus on disrupting FAMa deployments rather than capturing cities. Recent retaliatory attacks by jihadists against civilians in villages like Kori-Kori and Gomossogou highlight the tension between their violent tactics and their broader political strategy of positioning themselves as protectors against junta violence. The difficulty in controlling all factions within JNIM remains a critical vulnerability.
The fate of central and southern Mali is harder to predict for two reasons. First, the JNIM has controlled rural areas for years, besieging cities and negotiating local agreements with communities in exchange for limited Islamic law enforcement—a strategy akin to that of the Viet Cong in Vietnam or the Taliban in Afghanistan. Second, unlike the Taliban, the JNIM lacks the troop numbers to sustain large-scale territorial control.
The 2012-2013 capture of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou enabled jihadist groups to recruit extensively, particularly in central Mali communities. If this strategy is repeated, JNIM could significantly strengthen its ranks.
The blockade of Bamako is a strategy of suffocation and forced regime change or negotiation.
The blockade of Bamako is a strategy of suffocation and forced regime change or negotiation. Despite propaganda to the contrary, the junta’s inability to manage the crisis is evident. Assimi Goïta is trapped in Bamako, much like Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. Growing distrust between junta leaders, particularly Goïta’s waning confidence in the Russian partnership, could further destabilize the regime. With key pro-Russian figures like Sadio Camara and Modibo Koné sidelined, the junta may reconsider its alliance with Moscow. The Russian partnership could falter, accelerating the loss of northern and central Mali. Ongoing negotiations and months of tension between FAMa and Russian mercenaries—who have criticized the national army since the Tinzawaten defeat—add to the pressure.
For the junta, negotiations remain unlikely unless forced. To survive, the junta must maintain its Russian partnership, which could secure Bamako’s defense. If Russia gradually disengages, Mali will rely on limited support from Burkina Faso and Niger—both embroiled in their own conflicts with jihadists. Senegal may reinforce its borders but is unlikely to deploy troops inside Mali, given the JNIM’s growing threat along its frontier. Algeria, Mauritania, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire are likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach, privately welcoming the junta’s humiliation while pushing for negotiations.
Looking ahead:
- The fall of northern Mali is inevitable, and central Mali’s loss of control is only a matter of time. The timeline is uncertain, but the power dynamics are clear.
- The Russian partnership is fragile and doomed to fail, as is Bamako’s military strategy—evidenced by recent events.
- Two potential turning points could emerge:
• A negotiated settlement, driven by the junta’s collapse or diplomatic pressure.
• An external military intervention to reverse the balance of power and alter long- and medium-term dynamics.
Mali and the international community: possible scenarios
In this context, several non-exclusive scenarios are likely to unfold.
Scenario 1: The prospect of external military intervention
What action should be taken when JNIM raises its black flag over a major Malian city?
This question has lingered since 2022: What should be done when JNIM raises its black flag over a major Malian city? Prior to 2022, such a move would have triggered a Western military intervention (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Mali) to dismantle the jihadist group. However, withdrawals from Afghanistan and the Sahel have necessitated a reassessment of this approach, as military operations have repeatedly failed to resolve security crises. Is a regional or international military intervention desirable, feasible, or realistic? Regionally, only Algeria’s army could reverse the power dynamics, but it is unlikely to intervene beyond its borders due to its historical doctrine. Mauritania has maintained a non-aggression pact with AQMI and JNIM since 2010. Other regional armies have struggled against jihadist groups, suggesting they will prioritize defensive positions. An international intervention remains the only plausible option to shift the tide, akin to Operation Barkhane, but France and the UN are unlikely to return to the Sahel. European nations will not act alone, and the U.S. is focused on other military theaters. The Sahel is not a priority. These factors make negotiations the most likely path forward.
Scenario 2: The prospect of large-scale political negotiations
Since 2025, JNIM leaders have sought a victory akin to that of the HTC in Syria, implying a gradual acceptance of nationalizing their struggle and implementing a ‘moderate’ Islamic governance model while engaging in dialogue with the international community. To achieve this, JNIM has sought a sponsor since 2024, potentially Algeria or Mauritania—both of which maintain close ties with FLA leaders, engage with JNIM cadres, and oppose the Bamako junta. However, neither country has confirmed its willingness to play this role.
This intent suggests a strategy of collapsing the junta and negotiating with a political force amenable to their demands: implementation of Islamic law nationwide; increased autonomy for northern and central regions; integration of JNIM and FLA into local governance.
A significant hurdle remains: unlike the HTC, JNIM has not severed its allegiance to Al-Qaïda, nor has it abandoned its intent to export its Islamist project beyond Mali’s borders. Additionally, JNIM has not engaged in official dialogue with the international community, complicating efforts to normalize its status. It is unclear whether JNIM could be an acceptable negotiating partner for regional powers or European nations. The current political framework is unfavorable.
A comprehensive political negotiation would require discussions with both the FLA—building on the Algiers Accords—and the JNIM, extending local agreements negotiated with the High Islamic Council of Mali.
Progress is unlikely without pressure from Russian, Turkish, or African partners (e.g., Togo and Ghana) against the junta. Military or political recovery by Malian forces appears improbable. The blockade of Bamako may spur civil society or a counter-coup, but the junta’s systematic repression of opposition since 2020 makes such outcomes uncertain. Without negotiations, the strategy of strangulation will continue, and captured cities will serve as launchpads for further offensives against FAMa.
