A report published on 8 June 2026 has triggered intense debate after revealing that several French officers have returned to N’Djamena since mid-April to revive military cooperation between France and Chad. This move comes less than two years after Chad’s historic decision to end the French military presence.

Although Paris insists it does not plan to redeploy permanent forces on Chadian soil, the mere resumption of military cooperation and intelligence sharing raises serious questions about the impact on President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno’s image and the credibility of the political narrative he has built since coming to power.

A contradiction with the discourse of sovereignty and pan-Africanism

In the months following the departure of French forces, President Déby presented that decision as a victory for national sovereignty and a reclamation of the state’s strategic independence. He linked it to a discourse promoting emancipation from foreign dependencies and strengthening balanced partnerships, in line with the pan-African momentum gaining influence across the region.

Now, resuming military cooperation with Paris—even in a limited form—could be seen as a retreat from one of the most emblematic sovereign decisions promoted by his regime. This is especially significant because Chadian authorities repeatedly justified the end of military agreements by citing a lack of concrete results and strong popular pressure demanding the departure of French troops.

A risk for Chad’s regional image

Over the past two years, Chad has managed to consolidate its image as an influential regional power in security matters, capable of addressing threats through cooperation with its neighbors and diversification of international partnerships. President Déby also positioned himself as a regional mediator and a key player in stabilisation efforts in the Sahel and Central Africa.

However, returning under the umbrella of French intelligence could undermine this image and create the impression that N’Djamena ultimately failed to break free from its traditional partner, despite rhetoric about strategic autonomy. An equally critical element is that the decision to end the French military presence responded to popular demands expressed in multiple protests calling for France to leave Chad. Any rapprochement with Paris risks angering a significant part of public opinion, which viewed the French withdrawal as a sovereign achievement not to be reversed.

France, which politically fought Déby and hosted the opposition

The paradox is that France—now returning as a security partner—was, over the past two years, one of the main sources of pressure on Déby’s regime. In July 2024, accusations targeting the Chadian president and several family members were pursued by French justice in investigations over suspected embezzlement of public funds and expenditures on luxury hotels, high-end vehicles, and expensive clothing. These cases were revived in March 2026, accompanied by recurring speculation about a possible freeze of assets and accounts linked to the presidential family.

Returning to cooperation with a state that used its judicial and media institutions to personally target the head of state raises legitimate questions about the degree of political trust between the two parties. Furthermore, France hosted the largest gathering of Chadian political and politico-military opposition in Nantes in October 2025. Nearly twenty organisations and movements participated, aiming to coordinate their political, diplomatic, and military efforts against the authorities in N’Djamena.

Paris also played a notable role in the Succès Masra affair, through the involvement of French lawyers in his defence, efforts to facilitate his transfer to France for medical care, and media coverage of the case within the French parliament and various European and international institutions.

Between security imperatives and political cost

No one denies that Chad faces growing security challenges in the Lake Chad region and along its eastern and northern borders. However, the question now is whether the potential security benefits of a rapprochement with Paris justify the political and symbolic cost.

President Déby built much of his legitimacy on a discourse centred on sovereignty, independence, and rejection of any form of foreign dependence. Any resumption of military cooperation with France could weaken the credibility of that discourse and give his political opponents an opportunity to question the sincerity of the sovereignist project he has championed for years.

Finally, a fundamental question remains: how can one justify a return to a political, media, and judicial partner that hosted the opposition, criticised the regime, and attempted to pressure it on multiple files, only to be presented again to public opinion as indispensable for the future of national security?