Tchad caught in Sudan conflict as violence spills across border

After three years of relentless fighting, the Sudanese war has now spilled over into Chad. Cross-border strikes, rising military tensions, and deepening communal unrest: the crisis gripping Sudan is now directly impacting N’Djamena.

Chad’s delicate balancing act amid Sudan’s war

Since April 2023, Sudan has been torn apart by a brutal conflict between the army led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti. Though Chad has publicly maintained neutrality, behind the scenes, it has quietly backed the RSF. This hidden alignment has put N’Djamena in a precarious position: supporting a faction that has targeted Zaghawa communities in Darfur—while the Zaghawa form a key pillar of Chad’s own state apparatus. Weapons, reportedly funded by the United Arab Emirates, have been funneled through towns like Amdjarass and Adré, a risky move whose consequences were predictable—and are now unfolding.

Tiné: a flashpoint on the Chad-Sudan border

There are two towns named Tiné—one in Sudan, one in Chad—linked by shared Zaghawa populations and serving as a critical crossing point for civilians fleeing the violence in North Darfur. On February 21, 2026, the RSF seized control of the Sudanese side of Tiné, only to face immediate resistance from the Toroboro fighters—Chadian and Sudanese militants allied with General al-Burhan—and even unapproved Chadian troops. These clashes led to a swift recapture of the town. In response to the escalating danger, N’Djamena announced a border closure. Yet fighting continued unabated, confirming that the conflict has taken root in this borderland.

Against this already volatile backdrop, a deadly drone strike struck Tiné in Chad on March 21, killing nearly two dozen civilians. While Chadian authorities deny involvement, accusations are flying. Opposition figure Ousmane Dillo, now in exile in Sudan, released a widely circulated audio message directly blaming Mahamat Déby and calling for his removal, accusing him of endangering the Zaghawa community. On the Sudanese side, Darfur’s governor, Minni Arkou Minawi, took a bold step by declaring that “the war with Chad has already begun,” signaling a dangerous regional escalation.

N’Djamena’s hardline stance amid rising tensions

Chadian authorities have doubled down on their narrative of neutrality while vowing a “measured but firm” response to attacks. President Mahamat Déby has ordered the military to go on highest alert. A high-level security summit was convened in Tiné on March 22, bringing together top military officials to reinforce border defenses and prevent any destabilization of the country. “This is Tiné, Chad—not Tiné, Sudan. Let the Sudanese army, the Toroboro, the RSF fight it out in their own country. They must not bring this war here to kill our people,” declared General Ali Ahmat Akhabach, Minister of Security.

In a move with serious humanitarian repercussions, N’Djamena has barred civilians from crossing the border—denying women and children fleeing Sudan’s horrors access to safety in Chadian refugee camps. This decision, aimed at quelling potential Zaghawa unrest, is unlikely to curb insecurity. In fact, Cameron Hudson, a leading Sudan conflict analyst, warns: “The Chadian army’s military buildup at the Sudanese border amid rising tensions risks pulling Chad deeper into the Sudanese conflict, rather than keeping it out. By projecting an image of strength, Déby may be making a serious strategic miscalculation.”

How Sudan’s war is reigniting ethnic divisions in Chad

The conflict is not only pulling Zaghawa into Sudan’s war. According to Chadian security sources, the RSF has been recruiting young men from the Tama community over recent weeks. This recruitment, resembling mercenary activity, operates through local networks involving traditional leaders, administrative officials, and figures close to the government.

Like the Zaghawa, the Tama are a transborder community, present in eastern Chad (Wadi Fira, Ouaddaï) and western Sudan. Though not Arab, during the 2003 Darfur war they were integrated into the Janjaweed militias—the precursors to Hemedti’s forces—and fought against ethnic groups, including the Zaghawa. This resurgence is deeply concerning: it reopens old wounds within Chadian society and fuels fears of communal violence.

What was once a murky strategic calculation has now spiraled into a dangerous escalation. Chad’s government finds itself trapped in a cycle it may no longer be able to control. The genie is out of the bottle—and it won’t go back in.