Niger’s CFPD: behind the 1.8 billion FCFA monthly fund tearing the junta apart
Why a single decree turned Niger’s top generals into rivals
Behind the official bulletins and security briefings, a quieter conflict has been reshaping Niger’s military leadership. It centres on a protection force whose monthly financing runs into the billions of FCFA, and the fallout has already cost one prime minister his job.
At the heart of the matter sits the Commandement des Forces de Protection et de Développement (CFPD), a structure built to guard the country’s most valuable infrastructure. But the real battle is not about security. It is about who controls the men deployed, who decides which sites get protected, and who manages the money that flows through the system — an estimated 1.8 billion FCFA every month.
Three figures dominate the story: General Abdourahamane Tiani, head of the CNSP; General Salifou Mody, Minister of State for Defence; and Lamine Zeine, the former Finance Minister and Prime Minister. Their rivalry over this fund has exposed deeper fractures inside Niger’s ruling circle.
The origins of the CFPD
On 9 May 2024, General Abdourahamane Tiani signed decree No. 2024-309/P/CNSP/MDN, officially creating the Commandement des Forces de Protection et de Développement.
The new body was tasked with securing Niger’s strategic assets: mining and oil installations, transport corridors and pipelines. The Ministry of Defence confirmed the creation of the structure, which was meant to protect key sites and routes. In parallel, the recruitment of 10,000 young people in 2024 was intended to bolster the ranks of the Nigerien armed forces.
On paper, it looked like a straightforward security initiative. In practice, it set the stage for a power struggle that would soon consume the top of the government.
Article 28 and the 1.8 billion FCFA question
The financial core of the CFPD lies in Article 28 of the decree. It sets a Prime Unique d’Astreinte (PUA) of at least 12,000 FCFA per man per day, while requiring companies operating in the protected sectors to contribute financially to the scheme.
For a force of 5,000 men, the numbers add up quickly:
- Per day: 5,000 men × 12,000 FCFA = 60 million FCFA
- Per month (30 days): 1.8 billion FCFA
- Per year: 21.9 billion FCFA
These amounts are not theoretical. They are backed by contracts signed with businesses, payments made and troops deployed. This is the financial reality that turned the CFPD into the focal point of an internal power struggle.
When Defence collides with Finance
General Salifou Mody pushed hard for the CFPD to be implemented. General Tiani signed the decree under direct pressure from his Defence Minister.
But after the signature, the CNSP chief ordered Finance Minister Lamine Zeine to block the financial provisions of the CFPD. The result was a structure that existed on paper but lacked the means to operate. Mody found himself facing a direct political blockade of his own project.
The move revealed a fundamental split: Defence wanted the force running, while Finance was determined to keep its purse strings closed.
The Mody-Zeine feud
Lamine Zeine became the central point of friction. His ministry deliberately blocked the budgetary implementation of the military scheme.
By January 2026, Zeine was serving simultaneously as Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, while Salifou Mody held the post of Minister of State for Defence. Mody succeeded in stripping Zeine of the Finance portfolio, then forced his departure from the Prime Minister’s office. The CFPD conflict had destroyed trust among the pillars of the regime.
Mody takes the helm
The reshuffling of power ran through Zeine’s exit. General Mody took charge of the government and imposed a condition: he would serve as both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. In doing so, he concentrated political, military and administrative levers in his own hands.
It was a clear sign that the fight over the CFPD had become a fight over the entire architecture of state power.
Damolleydi: the second front
With the CFPD blocked, the regime launched a general mobilisation programme called “Damolleydi”, aimed at bringing volunteers and existing structures on board.
General Mody took charge of the committee overseeing this mobilisation, sidelining General Mohamed Toumba, the Minister of the Interior. Yet even as he led the initiative, Mody deliberately slowed its implementation. The programme lost visibility, gradually replaced by autonomous local structures.
It was another sign that control — not necessarily results — was the real objective.
Three levers of control
The CFPD affair locks the state apparatus around three critical axes:
- Command: control over the personnel assigned to strategic sites.
- Missions: the power to designate which infrastructure gets protected and to set priorities.
- Money: oversight of contributing companies and management of the financial flows they generate.
Article 28 of the decree governs this financial mechanism, which amounts to 1.8 billion FCFA per month.
Who really wins?
The 1.8 billion FCFA figure is the direct financial stake of the system. It confirms the political dimension of the CFPD, sitting at the crossroads of strategic resources, corporate contributors and the chain of command.
Beyond the personal rivalry between Tiani, Mody and Zeine, the victor in this confrontation would hold exclusive control over Niger’s men, missions and resources. Behind the quarrels of individuals lies a far bigger prize: total mastery of the state apparatus itself.
