Gabon’s fisheries reset: the untold story behind its new negotiating stance with Europe
The strategic rationale behind Libreville’s fisheries pivot
Gabon is preparing to reopen negotiations with the European Union on a fisheries partnership that extends far beyond the simple question of access for European vessels to its waters. After the previous agreement was terminated, Libreville now aims to redefine the economic, industrial and operational terms of a cooperation framework meant to govern the exploitation of its marine resources. The government gave the green light on 18 September to launch talks on a new Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement and its implementing protocol.
This resumption of dialogue comes more than a year after Gabon denounced the previous accord on 4 June 2025. With its protocol having expired on 28 June 2026, the European arrangement is now considered suspended. EU vessels no longer have a framework allowing them to fish in Gabonese waters. The former exclusivity clause also prevents bypassing this situation through simple individual authorisations.
For Libreville, the upcoming negotiation is an opportunity to rebalance a partnership whose local economic benefits have appeared limited relative to the potential of the resources involved.
Why the old economic model fell short
The first issue will inevitably be financial. The previous protocol was based on a reference capacity of 32,000 tonnes used to calculate the European contribution, without guaranteeing that volume of catches. The EU paid €1.6 million per year for access to the resources, plus an annual envelope of €1 million for sector development.
Yet actual results fell far short of the theoretical capacities. Between 2022 and 2024, European vessels caught an average of 10,604 tonnes per year. Of the 27 authorisations planned for purse seiners, only 54% were used on average. The six licences reserved for pole-and-line tuna vessels were never used at all.
This gap between theoretically open rights and actual use of resources should logically shape the next architecture of the partnership. The number of vessels, the price per tonne for access, and the methods for calculating the European contribution are among the parameters likely to be renegotiated.
But the central issue probably lies elsewhere: in Gabon’s ability to turn fishing activity into genuine local economic value.
From access rights to local value creation
The previous protocol required that at least 30% of catches could be transshipped in a Gabonese port, subject to acceptable economic and commercial conditions. When a vessel transshipped in Gabon, its by-catches also had to be fully landed there.
In practice, these provisions were rarely used. European vessels seldom visited Gabonese port infrastructure, and their catches were mainly landed and processed in Côte d’Ivoire. The European assessment estimates that Gabon captured only 23% of the added value generated by the arrangement, while 47% benefited other actors, notably in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, through port activities, onboard jobs and processing.
The next agreement must therefore determine whether Gabon intends simply to continue monetising access to its resource or to build a value chain more firmly rooted in its territory. The questions of landings, port infrastructure, processing and national employment thus become as important as the amount of financial compensation.
Sector financing is another potential point of friction. Of the €5 million in sectoral support planned over five years, only €2 million had been transferred at the time of the evaluation conducted between December 2024 and May 2025. Just over 20% of the multi-year envelope had been used. Some infrastructure remained unfinished, while the indicators used measured the delivery of outputs rather than their real economic effects.
Making the next deal measurable
The negotiations must also correct several technical weaknesses. The previous arrangement provided for the embarkation of qualified Gabonese sailors, but no list meeting the required criteria had been transmitted to European shipowners. The compensation planned for failure to embark was therefore not applied.
Catch monitoring must also be strengthened. The electronic reporting system was not fully operational, and methodological differences between the two parties had produced discrepancies in the available data. Under these conditions, transparency on actual volumes fished becomes a determining factor in assessing the value of the partnership.
The European evaluation recommends reconsidering the six licences never used for pole-and-line tuna vessels and adjusting the number of authorisations for purse seiners.
The next negotiation will therefore not be solely about an amount paid by Brussels in exchange for access to Gabonese waters. It must determine the conditions of a partnership where every tonne fished can be linked to identifiable benefits for the Gabonese economy, in terms of revenue, jobs, landings, processing and infrastructure development.
For both Libreville and Brussels, the challenge now is to draw the consequences of the previous agreement. The future partnership will be judged less on its theoretical commitments than on its ability to produce verifiable results. For Gabon, the renegotiation opens an important sequence in which marine resources become not only a question of access but a potential instrument of economic sovereignty and local value creation.
