Is dialogue with the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) necessary? Can talks with northern armed factions occur without compromising Mali’s unity? What role might imam Mahmoud Dicko play in a potential transition? Should Bamako reconsider its territorial organization? In an exclusive interview, Étienne Fabaka Sissoko, spokesperson for the Coalition of Forces for the Republic (CFR), outlines his vision for resolving the crisis, defines the movement’s red lines, and emphasizes that dialogue does not equate to alliance.

Questioning Mali’s security landscape

How do you assess the current security situation in Mali, particularly in Bamako? Is the blockade effective?

Étienne Fabaka Sissoko: To say the blockade is effective would imply that a strategy involving starvation, isolation, and civilian hostage-taking could be deemed successful. The blockade primarily generates suffering and daily hardship for Malians. In Bamako, supplies are increasingly unreliable, prices are rising, and families live in constant anxiety. For a landlocked nation like Mali, controlling supply corridors is a matter of national sovereignty. The CFR rejects this tactic because it disproportionately harms civilians.

This crisis also exposes the flaws of an exclusively military response. A sustainable solution requires a political approach that safeguards populations, secures critical supply routes, and restores the foundations for lasting peace.

Mali’s cry for peace

How has the CFR been received since its formation in December 2025? Do Malians genuinely seek an alternative to the current crisis?

Étienne Fabaka Sissoko: Though still in its early stages, the CFR fills a real void. Malians yearn for peace and a credible alternative to the ongoing turmoil. We are not a traditional political party but a platform dedicated to national preservation. There is a clear demand for a structured, responsible Malian voice—both domestically and internationally. Our mission is to offer a viable path between prolonged military rule and national stagnation. We aim to restore hope, not prolong divisions.

Some suggest close ties between the CFR and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). Could the CFR be seen as the political wing while the FLA serves as its armed counterpart?

Étienne Fabaka Sissoko: No. The CFR is not the FLA’s political arm, nor is the FLA our military extension. While we engage with all stakeholders, dialogue does not imply alliance or coordinated action. The CFR is a civilian movement with no involvement in military operations. Our stance is unequivocal: we oppose any partition of Mali. However, governance and territorial issues must be addressed through political channels. The CFR advocates for transparent, republican dialogue—not warfare. Our method is negotiation, not confrontation.

No automatic legitimacy for armed groups

Four months after the CFR’s launch, JNIM launched a major offensive across multiple regions. If this had led to the collapse of the current regime, would the CFR have been prepared to assume political leadership? Was a transition plan considered?

Étienne Fabaka Sissoko: A responsible movement must always prepare for crisis scenarios. Yet the CFR does not base its strategy on violent state collapse or the military victory of armed groups. The coordinated attacks of April 25, 2026, underscored Mali’s entry into a perilous political phase. This does not, however, grant armed factions automatic legitimacy to dictate the nation’s future.

Yes, we envisioned a civilian transition to safeguard national interests. Its mandate would restore public freedoms, protect civilians, initiate national dialogue, draft a new Constitution, and organize elections. The presidential vote should mark the end of this process—not its beginning. Without minimum security or national consensus, history would inevitably repeat itself. We cannot repeat past mistakes.

If the CFR were to assume power, what role could imam Mahmoud Dicko play?

Étienne Fabaka Sissoko: Imam Mahmoud Dicko should not be cast as a substitute political leader. His potential role lies in moral authority—easing tensions, fostering dialogue, and rebuilding trust among Mali’s diverse communities. Executive responsibilities must rest with legitimate civilian institutions. Political legitimacy must flow from the people and the ballot box.

No surrender, no rewards

You advocate dialogue with JNIM. How far are you willing to go? Are there absolute red lines? Some voices, including those linked to the CFR and FLA, suggest Iyad Ag Ghali may be open to abandoning transnational jihad in favor of peace. Do you share this view?

Étienne Fabaka Sissoko: Our proposed dialogue is neither surrender nor reward. It is a tool to end war and protect civilians. The core challenge lies in JNIM’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda, which is incompatible with a national peace process. Our red lines are non-negotiable: preserving Mali’s unity, upholding the republican state, protecting fundamental freedoms, severing ties with transnational armed agendas, halting attacks on civilians, and ensuring accountability for grave crimes.

Regarding Iyad Ag Ghali, the CFR does not base its strategy on assumptions about individuals. We neither confirm nor deny his willingness to abandon transnational jihad. Only verifiable actions matter. If factions within JNIM wish to join a strictly Malian peace process, they must prove it through deeds: ending attacks, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian access, cutting ties with Al-Qaeda, and accepting Mali’s unity. Attacks in neighboring countries reveal the regional nature of the threat. This is why any break from transnational agendas must be demonstrated, not merely declared. We do not negotiate away the Malian state. We seek conditions to end the war without abandoning the Republic.

No imposition of Sharia

You frequently discuss deep decentralization or federalism. Yet public debate often fixates on Sharia’s application in certain regions. Is this oversimplification?

Étienne Fabaka Sissoko: Absolutely. The real issue is the collapse of local governance. In many areas, the state is absent, justice is inaccessible, and public services fail. People turn to traditional leaders, notables, religious figures, or local mediators. The CFR does not advocate for Sharia. We propose a Malian Republic that integrates local mediation within a strictly constitutional framework. Principles are clear: respect for the Constitution, citizen equality, protection of women and children, and access to national justice.

The decentralization debate should focus on governance and state effectiveness—not caricatures.

Does federalism primarily concern the distribution of powers, resources, and revenue between Bamako and local governments?

Étienne Fabaka Sissoko: Precisely. The focus must be on competencies, resources, and democratic control. The CFR supports a unified, sovereign, and indivisible Mali—but one with stronger regional governance. Local governments need greater responsibilities and resources, while the state retains its sovereign functions. In a vast country like Mali, centralization in Bamako is inefficient. The state must guarantee national unity, but regions must have the means to manage local affairs effectively.

Restoring the essential state

Beyond criticism of current authorities, does the CFR have a structured political program? What are your concrete proposals for education, justice, security, and economic development?

Étienne Fabaka Sissoko: Yes. Our transition program prioritizes restoring the essential state. Key actions include reopening schools, strengthening the judiciary, protecting civilians, and reviving the economy. We champion judicial independence, support teachers, enhance security forces’ capabilities, and secure economic corridors. The crisis is also humanitarian. Restoring access to education, justice, security, energy, and food is our first step toward national reconstruction.

The CFR does not advocate revenge, partition, theocracy, or a return to the old system. We champion a peaceful exit from war through civilian transition, inclusive national dialogue, territorial refoundation, a republican army, and the restoration of popular choice. Mali will not be saved by a strongman. It will be saved by a strong national pact.