Burkina Faso’s evolving political landscape: charting the transition

Burkina Faso’s evolving political landscape: charting the transition
The interpretation of a coup d’état frequently shifts, influenced by the international community’s varying interests and endorsed by neighboring states. The selection of Transitional President Michel Kafando, for instance, was deemed unconstitutional. For at least twelve months, Burkina Faso was set to operate with institutions specifically crafted for this interim period.

Much like assembling a Lego set, the transitional institutions gradually took shape. Following the sudden emergence of military uniforms onto the public scene, in the wake of Blaise Compaoré’s hasty departure from Kosyam, a sense of calm began to settle over Ouagadougou.
Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, seemingly from nowhere, quickly asserted his authority, claiming all the prerogatives of a Head of State. What were his true intentions? How did he manage to integrate himself among the protestors and political party leaders? Was it perhaps a pre-arranged decision between President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré to dispatch him to the Place de la Révolution, aiming to retain control over power? Initially, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) aligning with the populace naturally sparked suspicion and mistrust. The military’s early actions, such as suspending the Constitution and dissolving the National Assembly, fueled fears of a junta taking hold. This threatened to strip the people, who had sacrificed and shed blood, of their hard-won victory.
True to form, the African Union immediately threatened to ostracize Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, ECOWAS heads of state – including John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Senegal – arrived en masse to gauge the military’s stance and urgently press them to reconsider their position. The precedents set by Captains Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali undoubtedly prompted Burkinabe officers to deliberate carefully: firstly, seizing power by force is rarely unpunished; secondly, a protracted crisis resolution process risked isolating the nation and incurring growing unpopularity.
Ultimately, the army negotiated a compromise solution, formalized in the Transition Charter. The agreement stipulated that the Executive branch’s transitional presidency would be led by a civilian, while the military would maintain significant influence over the government. Concurrently, a 90-member legislative body, the National Transition Council (CNT), was established to accommodate those who spearheaded the struggle. A Designation Committee, comprising around twenty members, bore the crucial responsibility of appointing a Transitional President. This was a fixed-term contract set to conclude in November 2015, marking the end of Blaise Compaoré’s original mandate.
For the Head of State’s appointment, each vital national component – the army, civil society, opposition parties, religious, and traditional authorities – was required to submit a shortlist within a specified timeframe. Ultimately, five individuals were selected:
The opposition and civil society put forward two journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, who leads the weekly ‘L’Evènement’, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publishing director of the weekly ‘Bendré’. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ strong criticism of the previous regime. The army adopted a broader approach, diversifying candidate profiles: Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso, a diplomat Michel Kafando, and a woman who was also a former minister, Joséphine Ouédraogo. Early on, the Archbishop of Bobo Dioulasso, an initial frontrunner, declared his disinterest in the role, preferring to focus on his current ministry.
The remaining two candidates held an advantage due to their extensive experience in prominent international institutions. Madame Joséphine Ouédraogo had served with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), while Michel Kafando represented his country at the UN headquarters in New York twice, from 1981 to 1982 and again from 1998 to 2011. In the ‘Land of the Upright People’, an invisible divide separates society into those for or against Thomas Sankara. This implicit cleavage profoundly shaped every political figure’s career. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity between 1984 and 1987. Michel Kafando, conversely, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Prime Minister Thomas Sankara’s government under President Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo in 1982. The two men reportedly had disagreements regarding the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy and held diametrically opposed ideologies.
A career within an international institution offers dual benefits: a boost to one’s CV and an expanded network of contacts. This proved to be a disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists put forward by the opposition.
For a few months, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, was compelled to leave his cattle and chicken farm in Saponé for a noble cause: to safeguard the nation in peril! He assumed both the Presidency of the Transition and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual role streamlined diplomatic channels, providing a single interlocutor and effectively bypassing the head of government, Isaac Zida.
Burkina Faso’s unfolding situation was closely monitored by several capitals: Accra, then chairing ECOWAS; Addis Ababa for the African Union; and Paris and Washington for geopolitical considerations. On the day of Michel Kafando’s inauguration, several Heads of State – from Mauritania (representing the AU), Ghana (representing ECOWAS), Togo, Benin, Mali, and Niger – attended, symbolizing a rehabilitation of Burkina Faso. Did this significant representation implicitly endorse the reinstatement of a constitution that had been suspended just weeks prior? The United States typically adheres to the principle of not cooperating with heads of state who haven’t received universal suffrage. Despite this, the international community found a way to legitimize the coup and restore a semblance of the Constitution. This ensured American reconnaissance planes could remain in Ouagadougou, as Uncle Sam relies on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as strategic footholds to monitor the Sahel region.
Out of 26 ministerial positions, the military secured four crucial portfolios: the Prime Minister also held the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, former Security Minister in 2011, took charge of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida’s spokesperson, was appointed to Sports; and Boubacar Ba assumed duties at the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo received the position of Keeper of the Seals – as a consolation – while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Civil Service. Adama Sagnon, who inherited the Ministry of Culture, resigned days after his appointment due to pressure from civil society, which criticized the former prosecutor for having shelved the Norbert Zongo case.
The National Transition Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected Chériff Sy Moumina, one of the unsuccessful candidates for the transitional presidency, as its president. He was chosen by his peers with 71 votes out of 90. The next steps involved finalizing the institutions and mechanisms necessary to guide Burkina Faso towards transparent and equitable elections: the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), the electoral code, and organic laws.

What critical tasks awaited this brief transitional period?
Since early December, Michel Kafando had signed the presidential decree establishing the Commission for National Reconciliation and Reforms (CRNR). What would be the scope and duration of this body’s mandate? Over 27 years after Thomas Sankara’s assassination, the ‘Land of the Upright People’ aimed to finally embark on a cathartic process. Shortly after his designation, one of President Michel Kafando’s initial decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s body. Prime Minister Isaac Zida also played a part, announcing that the file on President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be “fully opened” and that, if necessary, Burkina Faso would request Morocco’s “extradition” of former President Blaise Compaoré.
Through a series of public announcements, the current leaders effectively opened Pandora’s Box. Such complex cases typically require an extended period, likely surpassing the transition’s duration. Were these declarations made to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been Isaac Zida’s priority. In this context, General Gilbert Diendéré – Blaise Compaoré’s special chief of staff and thus Isaac Zida’s direct superior – was dismissed by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, former head of the RSP’s “Operations and Instruction” Bureau and also director of External Documentation, the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace.
Would Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma remain loyal to General Gilbert Diendéré? Burkina Faso successfully defused the political crisis of October 30th, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, with minimal major incidents. The intervention of RSP elements during the unrest could have triggered a civil war. Wouldn’t it be more prudent to focus on holding elections rather than implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other living civilian and military figures by exhuming the Sankara file?
How could a witch hunt be avoided? Two general managers of major national companies, considered close to the ousted president’s family, were already dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from Société Nationale Burkinabè des Hydrocarbures (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from Société Nationale Burkinabè d’Electricité (SONABEL). An act of contrition doesn’t fully absolve past transgressions but contributes to appeasement; this was the recent approach taken by Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, the nation paid tribute to the seven individuals who fell victim to bullets during the events of October 30th and 31st, now laid to rest in the Gounghin cemetery.
Will the CRNR endure beyond the transitional period? With all institutions now established, political figures and parties are set to take center stage. No prominent political leader sought a seat in either the Executive or the CNT, which effectively barred them from running in universal suffrage elections. Presidential candidates are now poised at the starting blocks. The creation of the CNT also prompted the dissolution of the CFOP, the opposition coalition. The electoral battle was certainly anticipated to commence in early 2015.

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