Bénin’s opposition challenges government on potential Niger military intervention

Bénin’s opposition challenges government on potential Niger military intervention

Following the military coup d’état that unfolded in Niger on July 26, 2023, international responses were swift and varied. Key organizations such as ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), alongside nations like the United States (USA), France, and Russia, promptly declared their positions. Within Bénin, the pronouncements by President Patrice Talon and the prospect of an armed intervention have not been universally welcomed. Western media outlets have suggested Bénin might commit troops alongside ECOWAS to confront the military junta. Numerous stakeholders, including the Catholic Church and political figures, have openly expressed their belief that a military option is not the appropriate path, advocating instead for diplomatic solutions to resolve the ongoing crisis.

Elected representatives from the opposition party, « Les Démocrates », have directly questioned the government’s stance on the situation, submitting a comprehensive list of 19 urgent inquiries. Their primary concern revolves around the justification for Bénin’s military involvement, particularly considering the longstanding fraternal relationship between Bénin and Niger. They have voiced apprehension regarding adherence to the Beninese constitution, the safety of deployed troops, and crucially, the potential for conflict escalation and its far-reaching implications for both the civilian population and Bénin itself.

Beyond military considerations, significant economic and diplomatic concerns have also been brought to the fore. The decision to close borders with Niger could lead to substantial repercussions for the Autonomous Port of Cotonou and the broader Beninese economy, which is already feeling the strain of ECOWAS sanctions. In light of rising prices for essential goods and the adverse effects on economic actors, the opposition insists on concrete answers from the government.

Dialogue is emerging as a preferred solution for various regional and international players. The opposition lawmakers have reminded President Patrice Talon of his own past advocacy for dialogue as an alternative to coups d’état, urging him to implement such an inclusive dialogue within Bénin. The current moment calls for careful consideration, thorough questioning, and, above all, the pursuit of peaceful and consensual solutions for the future stability of the region.

Oral debate with the government

On July 26, 2023, a military coup d’état occurred in Niger, prematurely ending the constitutional mandate of President Mohamed Bazoum. This event triggered reactions from numerous states globally and from sub-regional and regional organizations, including ECOWAS, the AU, and the United Nations (UN). On Thursday, August 10, 2023, the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS member countries convened an extraordinary summit, concluding with decisions that included ordering the deployment of the ECOWAS standby force to restore constitutional order in the Republic of Niger.

In response, the Beninese government, through its various declarations, has committed to deploying Beninese troops as part of the ECOWAS contingent tasked with confronting the military junta in power. Given this governmental decision to involve the Beninese state in a conflict against the sovereign and fraternal people of Niger, a move perceived as a violation of Article 101 of our constitution, and acknowledging the severe economic, social, and security impacts already stemming from sanctions imposed by the ECOWAS Heads of State conference on July 30, 2023, in Abuja, the National Assembly, pursuant to Article 108 and its subsections of its internal regulations, formally requests the government to address the following concerns:

  1. What measures has the government taken to seek parliamentary approval regarding the deployment of Beninese troops to the ECOWAS operational theater in Niger, should the threatened military option be implemented, in accordance with Article 101, paragraph 1, of our constitution, which states: « declaration of war is authorized by the National Assembly »?
  2. In anticipation of this conflict against the sovereign people of Niger, several countries, such as France and the United States, have made arrangements for the evacuation of their nationals from Niger. What provisions has the Beninese government made for its citizens residing in Niger?
  3. Given that Bénin and Niger are fraternal nations, what justifies Bénin’s agreement to send its troops to attack Niger, while other ECOWAS countries not bordering Niger refuse to participate?
  4. What is the estimated number of Beninese soldiers and the essential logistics the government intends to provide to the ECOWAS contingent? What is the projected cost of Bénin’s potential participation in this operation? Who will bear these expenses?
  5. In the event of an aggression against the fraternal nation of Niger, can our government provide assurance that no civilian lives in Niger, nor those of our soldiers, will be lost?
  6. What provisions has the government made for each soldier in terms of bonuses, and for each soldier’s family in the event of death on the theater of operations?
  7. As Bénin is a country bordering Niger, what guarantee does the government offer that, in the event of retaliation by the Nigerien army, no casualties will be recorded on Beninese soil?
  8. Can the government reassure the public that, in the event of war with Niger, potential jihadists will not exploit the situation to infiltrate our country, as observed in Libya?
  9. Would it not be wiser to prioritize political and diplomatic dialogue, as was the approach taken in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea?
  10. Is it not possible for Bénin to lead, as it has in the past within ECOWAS, in preventing coups d’état by actively combating electoral exclusions, imprisonment, and exile of political opponents?
  11. Why is ECOWAS more eager to react against military coups d’état while tolerating institutional coups, as witnessed in Côte d’Ivoire in 2020, Guinea in 2021, and Bénin in 2019, 2020, and 2021, and other nations?
  12. Is the restoration of President Mohamed Bazoum’s power more valuable than the lives of thousands of Nigerien civilians and ECOWAS contingent soldiers who could perish?
  13. What would become of Niger following such a conflict?
  14. The populations within the ECOWAS region no longer trust our organization, often labeling it a

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